Saint Thomas Aquinas…

…judges Francis’ idea on ‘diversified unity’

  • It is necessary to also preach to the evil so that they convert

We say that the preacher must always preach opportunely, if he adjusts to the rule of the truth, but not to the false esteem of the listeners, who judge the truth as inopportune; because he who preaches the truth is always for the good opportune, [and] for the evil inopportune. ‘Whoever belongs to God hears the words of God; for this reason you do not listen, because you do not belong to God’ (Jn 8:47). ‘How irksome she [Wisdom] is to the unruly! The fool cannot abide her’ (Sir 6:21). If one had to wait for an opportunity to speak only to those who wanted to hear, it would be only of advantage for the just; but it is necessary that at times he also preach to the evil so that they convert. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second Epistle of Timothy, lec. 1, 2 Tim 4:1–5)

…judges Francis’ idea on matrimony

  • One who submits to Christ’s sacraments obtains grace unless they enslaved themselves to sin through their own fault

But one who submits to Christ’s sacraments obtains grace from his power, so as not to be under the Law but under grace, unless they enslaved themselves to sin through their own fault. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, Rom 6:11 – 18)

…judges Francis’ idea on union in the Catholic Church

  • Whoever receives this sacrament is made one with Christ and incorporated in His members

In this sacrament, as in the others, that which is a sacrament is a sign of the reality of the sacrament. Now there is a twofold reality of this sacrament, as stated above (q. 73, a. 6): one which is signified and contained, namely, Christ Himself; while the other is signified but not contained, namely, Christ’s mystical body, which is the fellowship of the saints. Therefore, whoever receives this sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made one with Christ, and incorporated in His members. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 80, a. 4)

  • It is called Communion because we communicate with and are united to one another through it

This sacrament has a threefold significance. One with regard to the past, inasmuch as it is commemorative of our Lord’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, as stated above (q. 48, a. 3), and in this respect it is called a ‘Sacrifice.’ With regard to the present it has another meaning, namely, that of Ecclesiastical unity, in which men are aggregated through this Sacrament; and in this respect it is called ‘Communion’ or ‘Synaxis’. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. IV) that ‘it is called Communion because we communicate with Christ through it, both because we partake of His flesh and Godhead, and because we communicate with and are united to one another through it.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 73, a. 4)

  • The acts of religion are directed specifically towards God

As Isidore says (Etym. X), “according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from ‘religio,’ because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God,” so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, “In all thy ways think on Him.” According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei X, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that “we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect” [St. Augustine plays on the words ‘reeligere’ (to choose over again) and ‘negligere’ (to neglect or despise)]. Or again, religion may be derived from “religare” [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): “May religion bind us to the one Almighty God.” However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith. […] “It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions.” Now it is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs properly to religion, as stated above (q. 81). Wherefore it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 81 a. 1; q. 82, a. 2)

…judges Francis’ defense of the Jovinian heresy

  • The error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage

Objection: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): “Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood.”
I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. I) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1Cor 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking “on the things of God” [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think “on the things of the world,” as the Apostle says (1Cor 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-IIae, qu. 152, a.4)

  • The Jovinian heresy declared that marriage was equal in merit to virginity

Satan, in his jealousy of human perfection, has raised up several foolish and misleading men, who, by their teaching, have shown themselves hostile to the different modes of perfection of which we have been speaking. Vigilantius attacked the first counsel of perfection. […] Jovinian argued against the second counsel of perfection, and declared that marriage was equal in merit to virginity. St. Jerome refuted his opinions, in the book which he wrote against him. St. Augustine, likewise, thus speaks of his error, in his book Retractationum: “The heresy of Jovinian asserted that the merit of consecrated virgins was equalled by conjugal chastity. Hence, it is said that in Rome, certain nuns who had not hitherto been suspected of immorality, contracted marriage. Our holy mother the Church has always stoutly resisted this error. In the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus we find the following declaration: “It is not Christian but Jovinian to set virginity on a level with matrimony, or to deny an increase of merit to those who, for the sake of mortifying the flesh, refrain from wine or flesh meat.” (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The perfection of the spiritual life, Ch. XII)

…judges Francis’ idea that preaching the Gospel does not entail doctrinal and moral principles

  • The divine commandments are twofold: some are affirmative, and others are prohibitive

The second effect of charity is the observance of the divine commandments. Gregory says: “The love of God is never lazy. It does great things if it is there; if it refuses to work it is not love.” So a clear sign of charity is promptness in carrying out the divine precepts. For we see lovers doing great and difficult things for the sake of their beloved (Jn 14:23): “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word.” We should note that whoever keeps the law of divine love fulfils the whole law. Yet the divine commandments are twofold: Some are affirmative, and charity fulfils these, because the fulfilment of the law of commandments is love, by which the commandments are observed. Other commandments are prohibitive; charity also fulfils these, because it does not act perversely, as the Apostle says (1Cor 13). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Prologue)

  • To complete avoid sin: this is fulfill the commandment of love perfectly

But to fulfill this commandment of love perfectly, four things are required. […] The fourth is complete avoidance of sin. For no one can love God when he is living in sin (Mt 6:24): “You cannot serve God and mammon.” So, if you are living in sin, you do not love God. But that man loved God who said (Is 38:3): “Remember how I walked before you faithfully with a perfect heart.” Also Elijah said (1Kings 18:21): “For how long will you go on limping with two opinions?” As a lame person bends this way and that, so a sinner wavers between sinning and seeking God. Therefore the Lord said (Joel 2:12): “Turn to me with all your heart.” (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Prologue)

  • It is necessary that all external acts that are incompatible with righteousness be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom

The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink.” (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 108, a.1)

  • Charity can be lost entirely by sin

I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above (STh, II-II a.2; qq. 23,24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time – that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby “whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. XIV). Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte II, 24). Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is lost. It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “such as a man is, so does the end appear to him.” Accordingly charity is inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.

Replies to objections:
ad 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
ad 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.
ad 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
ad 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 24, a.11)

  • It is therefore essential to charity that one should so love God as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the rule of His commandments

Objection 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore [it would seem that] charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been committed.
On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death, according to Rm 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.” On the other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (Jn. 14:21): “He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him,” in which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.
I answer that, that one contrary is removed by the other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature, which consists in man’s loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying charity. If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above (a. 10, ad 3). Consequently, just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the soul. Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to God’s commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God’s friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 8, 12) that “man is enlightened by God’s presence, but he is darkened at once by God’s absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of the will.”


 Reply to Objection 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above (Gen. ad lit. 8, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 24, a.12)

…judges Francis’ idea on the Church’s rules on matrimony being ‘overly rigid’

  • Adultery and fornication destroy the soul

Adultery and fornication are forbidden for a number of reasons. First of all, because they destroy the soul: ‘He who is an adulterer has no sense, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul’ (Prov 6:32). It says: ‘for the folly of his heart,’ which is whenever the flesh dominates the spirit. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 8)

…judges Francis’ idea on Judas being a poor, penitent man

  • Repentance comes from hope, and despair from the contrary vice

While it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 20, a.1)

  • Nothing is more hateful than despair: to commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell

Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than others […] Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues […] when hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10: ‘If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,’ says: ‘Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the everyday toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of faith.’ And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono II, 14): ‘To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 20, a.3)

  • Despair makes it seem that one will never be able to rise to any good

On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is born of sloth. Now this is the proper object of hope that the thing is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason given above. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 20, a.4)

…judges Francis’ idea that the Orthodox are no longer schismatics

  • The sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity of the Church

As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name ‘from being a scission of minds,’ and scission is opposed to unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 39, a. 1)

  • The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying the commandments

The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say ‘rebelliously’ since a schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, wherefore not every sin is a schism. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 39, a. 1, sol. 2)

  • Schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff

Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head, according to Colossians 2:18,19: ‘Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God.’ Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 39, a. 1)

  • Schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity, and is the road to heresy

Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: ‘I consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church’ Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to 1Timothy 1:6: ‘From which things’, i.e. charity and the like, ‘some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling, so too, schism is the road to heresy’. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that ‘at the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 39, a. 1)

  • …but the Greek-schismatics affirm that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son

So, also, at the present time some are described as dissolving Christ by diminishing His dignity so far as this lies in their power. In saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, they lessen His dignity, since He together with the Father is the Spirator of the Holy Spirit. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Contra errores Graecorum, Part II, Proglogue)

  • If the Holy Ghost did not proceed also from the Son, then He would not be personally distinguished from Him: the Trinity would not exist, and there would be only two divine Persons

It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (q. 28, a.3; q.30, a.2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.2 sol)

  • Proof of the filioque: The Son proceeds from the Father as His Word, and the Holy Ghost as Love: love must proceed from a word, for we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception

Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (q.28, a.44). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a ‘principle’ and of what is ‘from the principle.’ Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess. Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (a.27, a.2,4; q.28, a.4), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.2 sol)

  • It cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father so that neither of them proceeds from the other: unless we admit a material distinction between them, which is impossible in God

We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Fathr, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.2 sol)

  • The Greeks themselves are forced to recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son, but obstinately deny that He proceeds from Him

Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit ‘of the Son’; and that He is from the Father ‘through the Son.’ Some of them are said also to concede that ‘He is from the Son’; or that ‘He flows from the Son,’ but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.2 sol)

  • The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son

The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian […] (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.2 ad 3)

  • The error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff

In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when certain errors rose up, another council [Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.2)

  • It can also be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son; but never can it be denied that the father and the Son are one principle of the Spirit

Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition ‘through’ points out, in what is covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition ‘through’ is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition ‘through’ is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition ‘through’ sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king. Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same meaning. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.3 sol)

  • As the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son

In every action two things are to be considered, the suppositum acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a.3, ad 1)

  • They deny that there is one head of the Church and dissolve the unity of the Mystical Body

In denying, moreover, that there is one head of the Church, namely, the holy Roman Church, they clearly dissolve the unity of the Mystical Body; for there cannot be one body if there is not one head, nor one congregation if there is not one ruler. Hence, John 10:16 says: There will be one fold and one shepherd. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Contra errores Graecorum, Part II, Prologue)

  • They deny purgatory

In denying purgatory they also lessen the power of this sacrament which is offered in the Church both for the living and for the dead; for if purgatory does not exist, it avails the dead nothing; it cannot profit them if they are in hell, where there is no redemption; nor can it do them any good if they are in heaven, where they are in no need of our prayers. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Contra errores Graecorum, Part II, Prologue)

  • Whoever even believes some things that the Church teaches while rejecting others does not have the virtue of Faith, since he rejects the authority of God, and follows his own will

Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith. The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 5, a. 3)

…judges Francis’ idea on God’s mercy aimed at religious syncretism

  • God’s mercy does not reach those who render themselves unworthy of it

God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica Supplement, q. 99, a.2, ad. 1)

  • Ever since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to observe the ceremonies of the old rites

The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): ‘If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.’ But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s fruit. Therefore since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies. All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. […] In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I–II, q. 103, a. 4)

  • The judicial precepts of the Old Law were annulled by the coming of Christ

The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only ‘dead,’ but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 104, a. 1.3)

  • Because the Old Testament was imperfect, a New Testament is promised to them

Thirdly, he shows the manner of salvation when he says: And this will be my covenant with them, a new one from me, when I take away their sins. For the old covenant did not remove sins, because “it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins” (Heb 10:4). Therefore, because the Old Testament was imperfect, a new testament is promised to them […] (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Ch. 11, 25–32, no. 920)

  • We must love our neighbor with justice and holiness; we must not love him above God, by doing so God is lost

So “Love your neighbor as yourself.” […] Regarding this, there are five points we must observe in loving our neighbor: The first is that we must love him really as ourselves. We do this if we love him for his own sake, not because of our own interest. Here recall that there are three kinds of love. The first is utilitarian […] It vanishes when the advantage vanishes. In that case we do not wish good for our neighbor, but rather our own advantage. There is another love directed at what is pleasurable. This too is not true love, because when the pleasure vanishes it vanishes. In that case we do not wish good primarily for our neighbor, but rather we want his good for ourselves. The third kind of love is for the sake of virtue, and only that is true love. For then we do not love our neighbor in view of our own good, but for his own good. […] The second point is that we must love ordinately, that is, we must not love him above God or as much as God, but along with him in the way you must love yourself (Sg 2:4 Vulg.): “He ordered love in me.” The Lord taught this order (Mt 10:37): “Whoever loves his father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and whoever loves son or daughter above me is not worthy of me.” […] The fifth point is that we must love with justice and holiness, so that we do not love to bring him to sin, because you should not love yourself that way, since by doing so you lose God. Thus it is said (Jn 15:9): “Remain in my love.” This is the love spoken of (Sir 24:24 Vulg.): “I am the mother of beautiful love.” (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Ten Commandments, Article 2)

  • To love one’s neighbor is to hate his sin and wish him to be good

We must be aware, however, of texts to the contrary. For the saints hated some people (Ps 138:22): “I hated them with perfect hatred.” And in the Gospel (Lk 14:26): “If anyone does not hate his father and mother and wife and sons and brothers and sisters, even his own soul, he cannot be my disciple.” We should realize that in all that we do, what Christ did should be our example. For God loves and hates. In any man two things should be considered: his nature and the wrong. What is of nature in man should be loved, what is wrong should be hated. So if anyone wished a person to be in hell, he would be hating his nature, but if he wished him to be good, he would be hating the sin, which should always be hated (Ps 5:7): “You hate all who do evil.” And (Wis 11:25), “Lord, you love all that exists, and hate nothing which you have made.” See, then, what God loves and hates: He loves what is of nature and hates what is wrong. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Ten Commandments, Article 2)

  • It is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner; and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss

Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated above (a. 3; q. 23, a.1,5), wherefore we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature. On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one’s father or mother or kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God’s sake. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 25, a. 6)

  • To overlook wrongs inflicted on God by sinners is most wicked

The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth.] says: ‘It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s wrongs is most wicked.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 108, a. 1, ad. 2)

…judges Francis’ idea on the Church having defects

  • If the sinner is unwilling to amend his ways, he should be made to cease sinning by being punished

As stated above (a. 3) the correction of the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an example of. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 33, a. 6)

…judges Francis’ idea that it is no longer necessary to declare one’s sins to a confessor to be pardoned

  • Neglecting to confess one’s sin is opposed to Penance

To hide one’s sins may happen in two ways: first, in the very act of sinning. […] Secondly, one hides one’s sin previously committed, by neglecting to confess it: this is opposed to Penance, and to hide one’s sins thus is not a second plank, but is the reverse, since it is written (Prov. 28:13): ‘He that hideth his sins shall not prosper.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 84, ad 1)

  • Confession of faith should be made ‘with the mouth’; therefore confession of sins should also

Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made ‘with the mouth’, as appears from Romans 10:10, therefore confession of sins should also. Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent should confess his own sins. I answer that Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. […] yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Supplement, q. 9, a. 4)

  • Even in the case of a language barrier accusation of sins is still required

Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one’s sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act. It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man is not bound to do more than he can. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Supplement, q. 9, a. 3)

  • Our Lord admonished men, pointing to the particular manner of actions required for this Sacrament

As stated above (a. 1, ad 1/ad 2), in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are as matter, while the part taken by the priest, who works as Christ’s minister, is the formal and completive element of the sacrament. Now in the other sacraments the matter pre-exists, being provided by nature, as water, or by art, as bread: but that such and such a matter be employed for a sacrament requires to be decided by the institution; while the sacrament derives its form and power entirely from the institution of Christ, from Whose Passion the power of the sacraments proceeds. Accordingly the matter of this sacrament pre-exists, being provided by nature; since it is by a natural principle of reason that man is moved to repent of the evil he has done: yet it is due to Divine institution that man does penance in this or that way. Wherefore at the outset of His preaching, our Lord admonished men, not only to repent, but also to ‘do penance’, thus pointing to the particular manner of actions required for this sacrament. As to the part to be taken by the ministers, this was fixed by our Lord when He said to Peter (Mt 16:19): ‘To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,’ etc.; but it was after His resurrection that He made known the efficacy of this sacrament and the source of its power, when He said (Lk 24:47) that ‘penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations,’ after speaking of His Passion and resurrection. Because it is from the power of the name of Jesus Christ suffering and rising again that this sacrament is efficacious unto the remission of sins. It is therefore evident that this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 84, ad. 7)

  • Three parts of the Sacrament of Penance: contrition, confession, and satisfaction

In Penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God’s place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he atone according to the decision of God’s minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 90, a. 2)

  • Confession should be an ‘accusation’ on the part of the penitent

Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. […] By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four things […] fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known, and in this respect confession should be ‘entire’. […] Wherefore it should be an ‘accusation’ [accusans] on the part of the penitent. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Supplement, q. 9, a. 4)

  • Sin is taken away by the power of Christ’s Passion, operating through the priest’s absolution and the acts of the penitent

But ‘sin, when it is completed, begetteth death’ (Jas 1:15). Consequently it is necessary for the sinner’s salvation that sin be taken away from him; which cannot be done without the sacrament of Penance, wherein the power of Christ’s Passion operates through the priest’s absolution and the acts of the penitent, who co-operates with grace unto the destruction of his sin. For as Augustine says (Tract. LXXII in Joan.), ‘He Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 84, a. 5)

  • The acts performed outwardly, both by repentant sinner and priest, are part of the cause of forgiveness of sin

In Penance also, there is something which is sacrament only, viz. the acts performed outwardly both by the repentant sinner, and by the priest in giving absolution; that which is reality and sacrament is the sinner’s inward repentance; while that which is reality, and not sacrament, is the forgiveness of sin. The first of these taken altogether is the cause of the second; and the first and second together are the cause of the third. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 84, a.1, ad. 3)

  • The perfection of Penance is integrated by the aforementioned three parts

Integral parts are those by which the perfection of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of Penance. Some have said that these three are subjective parts of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the point in question. Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts: yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at the same time. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 90, a. 3)

  • If man lose his integrity through sin, may he regain it by means of Penance

Consequently penance holds the second place with regard to the state of integrity which is bestowed and safeguarded by the aforesaid sacraments, so that it is called metaphorically ‘a second plank after shipwreck’. For just as the first help for those who cross the sea is to be safeguarded in a whole ship, while the second help when the ship is wrecked, is to cling to a plank; so too the first help in this life’s ocean is that man safeguard his integrity, while the second help is, if he lose his integrity through sin, that he regain it by means of Penance. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 84, a. 6)

  • It is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind

In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the sick person. […] The same is to be said in regard to sins. […] Hence it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of confession. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Supplement, q. 9, a2)

  • Those who confess some sins, and others not, sin by doing so, because they intend to deceive God

Then there are those who confess some sins, and others not, or they split their confession between two or more confessors. But these do not merit, and rather sin by doing so, because they intend to deceive God and they are making a rift in the sacrament. Against the first group someone said, ‘It is unholy to hope for half-pardon from God’. As for the second group (Ps 61:9): ‘Pour out your hearts before him’, because in confession all is to be revealed. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Ten Commandments, no. 38, Prologue)

…judges Francis’ attitude towards public sinners, changing Vatican protocol

  • We ought to love the good more than those who are not so near to God

In this way we ought not to love all equally. […] Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 26, a. 6)

  • All should avoid the society of sinners as regards fellowship in sin

Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): ‘Go out from among them…and touch not the unclean thing,’ i.e. by consenting to sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad. 5)

  • It is not unjust for God to inflict eternal punishment for a sin that is not repented

The suffering of eternal punishment is in no way opposed to divine justice. Even in the laws men make, punishment need not correspond to the offense in point of time. For the crime of adultery or murder, either of which may be committed in a brief span of time, human law may prescribe lifelong exile or even death, by both of which the criminal is banned forever from the society of the state. Exile, it is true, does not last forever, but this is purely accidental, owing to the fact that man’s life is not everlasting; but the intention of the judge, we may assume, is to sentence the criminal to perpetual punishment, so far as he can. In the same way it is not unjust for God to inflict eternal punishment for a sin committed in a moment of time. We should also take into consideration the fact that eternal punishment is inflicted on a sinner who does not repent of his sin, and so he continues in his sin up to his death. And since he is in sin for eternity, he is reasonably punished by God for all eternity. Furthermore, any sin committed against God has a certain infinity when regarded from the side of God, against whom it is committed. For, clearly, the greater the person who is offended, the more grievous is the offense. He who strikes a soldier is held more gravely accountable than if he struck a peasant; and his offense is much more serious if he strikes a prince or a king. Accordingly, since God is infinitely great, an offense committed against Him is in a certain respect infinite; and so a punishment that is in a certain respect infinite is duly attached to it. Such a punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, for nothing created can be infinite in this way. Consequently a punishment that is infinite in duration is rightly inflicted for mortal sin. Moreover, while a person is still capable of correction, temporal punishment is imposed for his emendation or cleansing. But if a sinner is incorrigible, so that his will is obstinately fixed in sin, as we said above is the case with the damned, his punishment ought never to come to an end. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium of Theology, Ch. 183)

…judges Francis’ idea that Christ was stained by sin

  • “He made him to be sin”, that is, ‘the victim of sacrifice for sin’

In one way because it was the custom of the Old Law to call a sacrifice for sin “sin”: ‘They feed on the sin of my people’ (Hos. 4:8), i.e., the offerings for sin. Then the sense is: he made him to be sin, i.e., the victim of sacrifice for sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second epistle to the Corinthian, no. 201)

  • “He made him to be sin”: that is, ‘he made him assume mortal and suffering flesh’

In another way, because sin is sometimes taken for the likeness of sin, or the punishment of sin: ‘God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh’ (Rom. 8:3). Then the sense is: he made him to be sin, i.e., made him assume mortal and suffering flesh. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second epistle to the Corinthian, no. 201)

  • ‘He made him to be sin’: that is, ‘made him regarded a sinner’

In a third way, because one thing is said to be this or that, not because it is so, but because man considers it such. Then the sense is: he made him to be sin, i.e., made him regarded a sinner: ‘He was numbered with the transgressors’ (Is. 53:12). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second epistle to the Corinthian, no. 201)

  • In Christ there was no proneness towards evil, much less could there be sin

Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have the fullness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace. And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are some defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a difficulty in well-doing. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 14, a. 4, sol)

…judges Francis’ idea on conversion of the papacy

  • The unity of the Church demands that there be one head of the entire Church…

Then, too, the unity of the Church requires that all the faithful agree as to the faith. But about matters of faith it happens that questions arise. A diversity of pronouncements, of course, would divide the Church, if it were not preserved in unity by the pronouncement of one. Therefore, the unity of the Church demands that there be one who is at the head of the entire Church. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book IV, Ch. 76)

…judges Francis’ idea on confession

  • Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ’s place

The head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; […] differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain special places […] Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ’s place, according to 2Cor 2:10, ‘For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ’, and 2Cor 5:20, ‘For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by us’. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 8, a. 6)

…judges Francis’ idea on reforming the Church

  • All ceremonies are professions of faith

All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I–II, q. 103, a.4)

…judges Francis’ idea on the Church’s moral teaching

  • The reason why the Sabbath is mentioned in the precepts of the Decalogue

And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Is 58:13): “If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious.” Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the Decalogue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I–II, q. 100, a. 5, ad. 2)

  • The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of God; as to the fixing of the time, it is a ceremonial precept

The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of God, according to Ps. 45:11: ‘Be still and see that I am God.” In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the Decalogue: but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I–II, q. 100, a. 3, ad. 2)

  • As to the Sabbath, its place is taken by the “Lord’s Day,” since the shadow gives way to the what was prefigured

I answer that, all the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above (q.101, a. 1 and 2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them – min both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. […] As to the Sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the “Lord’s Day,” which recalls the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 103, a.3, sol/ ad 4)

  • How should a Christian keep the Sabbath?

“Remember that you keep holy (sanctify) the Sabbath day.” We have already said that, as the Jews celebrated the Sabbath, so do we Christians observe the Sunday and all principal feasts. Let us now see in what way we should keep these days. We ought to know that God did not say to “keep” the Sabbath, but to remember to keep it holy. The word “holy” may be taken in two ways. Sometimes “holy” (sanctified) is the same as pure: “But you are washed, but you are sanctified” (1Cor 6:11). (that is, made holy). Then again at times “holy” is said of a thing consecrated to the worship of God, as, for instance, a place, a season, vestments, and the holy vessels. Therefore, in these two ways we ought to celebrate the feasts, that is, both purely and by giving ourselves over to divine service. We shall consider two things regarding this Commandment. First, what should be avoided on a feast day, and secondly, what we should do. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 5)

  • What should we avoid on the Sabbath?

We ought to avoid three things. The first is servile work. Avoidance of Servile Work. – “Neither do any work; sanctify the Sabbath day” (Jer 17:22). And so also it is said in the Law: “You shall do no servile work therein” (Lev 23:25). Now, servile work is bodily work; whereas “free work” (i.e., non-servile work) is done by the mind, for instance, the exercise of the intellect and such like. And one cannot be servilely bound to do this kind of work.
When Servile Work Is Lawful. – We ought to know, however, that servile work can be done on the Sabbath for four reasons. The first reason is necessity. Wherefore, the Lord excused the disciples plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath, as we read in St. Matthew (12:3–5). The second reason is when the work is done for the service of the Church; as we see in the same Gospel how the priests did all things necessary in the Temple on the Sabbath day. The third reason is for the good of our neighbor; for on the Sabbath the Saviour cured one having a withered hand, and He refuted the Jews who reprimanded Him, by citing the example of the sheep in a pit (“ibid.”). And the fourth reason is the authority of our superiors. Thus, God commanded the Jews to circumcise on the Sabbath (Jn 7:22–23).
Avoidance of Sin and Negligence on the Sabbath. – Another thing to be avoided on the Sabbath is sin: ‘Take heed to your souls, and carry no burdens on the Sabbath day’ (Jer 18:21). This weight and burden on the soul is sin: ‘My iniquities as a heavy burden are become heavy upon me’ (Ps 37:5). Now, sin is a servile work because ‘whoever commits sin is the servant of sin’ (Jn 8:34). Therefore, when it is said, ‘You shall do no servile work therein,’ (Lev 3:25). it can be understood of sin. Thus, one violates this commandment as often as one commits sin on the Sabbath; and so both by working and by sin God is offended. ‘The Sabbaths and other festivals I will not abide.’ And why? ‘Because your assemblies are wicked. My soul hates your new moon and your solemnities; they are become troublesome to me’ (Is 1:13)
Another thing to avoid on the Sabbath is idleness: ‘For idleness has taught much evil’ (Sir 33:29). St. Jerome says: “Always do some good work, and the devil will always find you occupied” (Ep. ad Rusticum). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 5)

  • What should one do on the Sabbath?

Now it must be shown with what we should occupy ourselves, and they are three in number. The Offering of Sacrifice. – The first is the offering of sacrifices. In the Book of Numbers (28:3–10) it is written how God ordered that on each day there be offered one lamb in the morning and another in the evening, but on the Sabbath day the number should be doubled. And this showed that on the Sabbath we should offer sacrifice to God from all that we possess: ‘All things are Yours; and we have given You what we received from your hand’ (1 Chron 29:14). We should offer, first of all, our soul to God, being sorry for our sins: ‘A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit’ (Ps 50:19); and also pray for His blessings: ‘Let my prayer be directed as incense in your sight’ (Ps 140:2). Feast days were instituted for that spiritual joy which is the effect of prayer. Therefore, on such days our prayers should be multiplied.
Secondly, we should offer our body, by mortifying it with fasting: ‘I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present your bodies a living sacrifice’(Rm 12:1), and also by praising God: ‘The sacrifice of praise shall honor Me’ (Ps 49:23). And thus on these days our hymns should be more numerous. Thirdly, we should sacrifice our possessions by giving alms: ‘And do not forget to do good, and to impart; for by such sacrifice God’s favor is obtained’ (Hb 13:16). And this alms ought to be more than on other days because the Sabbath is a day of common joys: ‘Send portions to those who have not prepared for themselves, because it is the holy day of the Lord’ (Neh 8:10).
Hearing of God’s Word. – Our second duty on the Sabbath is to be eager to hear the word of God. This the Jews did daily: ‘The voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath’ (Acts 13:27). Therefore Christians, whose justice should be more perfect, ought to come together on the Sabbath to hear sermons and participate in the services of the Church! ‘He who is of God, hears the words of God’ (Jn 8:47). We likewise ought to speak with profit to others: ‘Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but what is good for sanctification’ (Eph 4:29). These two practices are good for the soul of the sinner, because they change his heart for the better: ‘Are not My words as a fire, says the Lord, and as a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?’ (Jer 23:29). The opposite effect is had on those, even the perfect, who neither speak nor hear profitable things: ‘Evil communications corrupt good manners. Awake, you just, and do no sin’ (1Cor 15:33). ‘Your words have I hidden in my heart’ (Ps 118:11). God’s word enlightens the ignorant: ‘Your word is a lamp to my feet’ (Ps 118:105). It inflames the lukewarm: ‘The word of the Lord inflamed him’ (Ps 114:19).
The contemplation of divine things may be exercised on the Sabbath. However, this is for the more perfect. ‘O taste, and see that the Lord is sweet’ (Ps 33:9), and this is because of the quiet of the soul. For just as the tired body desires rest, so also does the soul. But the soul’s proper rest is in God: ‘Be for me a God, a protector, and a house of refuge’ (Ps 30:3). ‘There remains therefore a day of rest for the people of God. For he who has entered into his rest has also rested from his works, as God did from His’ (Hb 4:9–10). When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her’ (i.e., Wisdom) (Wis 8:16).
However, before the soul arrives at this rest, three other rests must precede. The first is the rest from the turmoil of sin: ‘But the wicked are like the raging sea which cannot rest’ (Is 57:20). The second rest is from the passions of the flesh, because ‘the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh’ (Gal 5:17). The third is rest from the occupations of the world: ‘Martha, Martha, you art careful and art troubled about many things’ (Lk 10:41). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 5)

  • The precepts of the Decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever

As stated above (q. 96, a. 6; q. 97, a. 4), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as this – that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of some greater utility. […] Now the precepts of the Decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the Decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the Decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 100, a. 8)

  • Does Scripture offer an instance of dispensation from a precept ordained by the Decalogue?

Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the Decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): “And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.” Therefore the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable. […] This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mt 12:3, seqq.). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 100, a. 8)

  • Human acts, in their external and internal dimension, have a moral significance since they are voluntary

Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object. Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 2) that “he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief.” (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 18, a. 6)

  • Every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be either good or bad

It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (a. 3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad. […] Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man’s action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 18, a.9; ad 3)

  • Sin arises from doing what one ought not, or by not doing what one ought to do

More things are required for good than for evil, since “good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. IV): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.
The term “voluntary” is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will, and not to will. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 71, a.5, ad. 1–2)

  • Sin is nothing else than a bad human act – it means voluntarily going against the rule of the human will, namely human reason, which is created in accord with God’s eternal reason

As was shown above (a. 1), sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. XXII, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says “word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, “contrary to the eternal law.” (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 71, a. 6)

…judges Francis’ idea on Christians and Muslims sharing the same points

  • There is not one pronouncement on the part of the prophets offering Mohammed any witness

Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him (Mohammed) any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be. seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book I, ch. 6, no. 4)

  • Muhammed seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure

The point is clear in the case of Muhammad. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book I, ch. 6, no. 4)

…judges Francis’ idea on the Church’s fault for the Anglican schism

  • A heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will

Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith. The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 5, a. 3)

  • He chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own mind

Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words; so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine. Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own mind. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II–II, q. 11, a.1)

  • The sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals

Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above (I-II, q. 71, a. 6; I-II, q. 73, a. 3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him. […] Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II–II, a. 3)

  • The unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews and the pagans who have never accepted the Gospel faith

It is written (2Pet 2:21): ‘It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back.’ Now the heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin. As stated above (a. 5), two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.   The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do. Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above (a. 1) unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (a. 1) seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 10, a.6)

…judges Francis’ idea on obtaining spiritual fruits in other religions

  • The rites of other unbelievers are by no means to be tolerated, except in order to avoid an evil

On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 10, a. 11)

  • Expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole flock perish

With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death. On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but ‘after the first and second admonition,’ as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome commenting on Galatians 5:9, ‘A little leaven,’ says: ‘Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 11, a. 3)

  • Fasting is practiced to bridle lust, elevate the mind to contemplation and to satisfy for sins

An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] (cf. q. 145, a. 1) good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2Cor 6:5, 6): ‘In fasting, in chastity,’ since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome (Contra Jov. II) ‘Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,’ that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): ‘Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II, q. 147, a. 1)

…judges Francis’ idea on Ecumenical dialogue

  • The fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated

According to Wis 11:11, ‘By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished’. Now a schismatic, as shown above (a.1), commits a twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 39, a. 4)

  • Just as he who drinks the chalice of the Lord becomes one with him, he who drinks the chalice of the demons becomes one with them

Effectively we are one in his mystical body. […] He reasoning is, then, of this nature: just as he who drinks the chalice of the Lord becomes one with him, in the same way, he who drinks the chalice of the demons becomes one with them. But if there is something that above all should be fled from, it is union with the demons. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, cap. 10, lec. 4: 1Cor 10:14–17 – rep. Pet. Tar.)

  • Dialogue with unbelievers should be undertaken by those who are firm in faith and such that it will lead to conversion

For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II–II, q. 10, a. 9)

…judges Francis’ idea on God judging us by loving us

  • Vice leads to final wretchedness in the next world

In this matter we should note that contrary causes beget contrary effects. Thus action that proceeds from malice is contrary to action that proceeds from virtue. Accordingly wretchedness, in which evil action issues, is the opposite of happiness, which virtuous action merits. Furthermore, contraries pertain to the same genus. Therefore, since final happiness, which is reached by virtuous action, is a good that belongs not to this life but to the next life, as is clear from an earlier discussion, final wretchedness, also, to which vice leads, must be an evil belonging to the next world. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium of Theology, Ch. 173)

  • One who does not persevere in discipline is not a son of God

In regard to the first he gives this reason: All the saints who have pleased God passed through many tribulations, by which they were made sons of God. Therefore, one who does not persevere in discipline is not a son but a bastard, i.e., born of adultery. From this reason he draws this conclusion: If you are left without discipline [chastisement], in which all have participated, then you are illegitimate children and not sons. ‘All who would live godly lives in Christ will suffer persecution’ (2Tim 3:12); ‘All that have pleased God passed through many tribulations, remaining faithful’ (Judith 8:23). Nor is it necessary that the saints always have outward tribulations, when they are afflicted inwardly by the wicked lives of perverse men: ‘Lot dwelling among them that vexed the just soul from day to day with unjust works’ (2Pet 2:8). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Hebrews, no. 678, Heb 12:5 – 11)

…judges Francis’ idea on Jesus asking forgiveness from his parents

  • Calling the loss of Jesus in the temple as acts of His childhood is of a devilish mind and perverse will

This is the first demonstration of the power of the Child Jesus. For as to what are called acts of His childhood, we cannot but suppose them to be the work not only of a childish but even of a devilish mind and perverse will, attempting to revile those things which are contained in the Gospel and the sacred prophecies. (Ancient Greek expositor quoted by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aurea on Luke 2:42–50)

  • Jesus secretly remained behind, so that He to avoid appearing disobedient

The feast having been celebrated, while the rest returned, Jesus secretly tarried behind. As it follows, And when they had fulfilled the days, as they returned, the child Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem; and his parents knew not of it. It is said, When the days were accomplished, because the feast lasted seven days. But the reason of His tarrying behind in secret was, that His parents might not be a hindrance to His carrying on the discussion with the lawyers; or perhaps to avoid appearing to despise his parents by not obeying their commands. He remains therefore secretly, that he might neither be kept away nor be disobedient. (Ancient Greek expositor quoted by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aurea on Luke 2:42–50)

  • Mary yielded to Jesus not as to a boy but as unto God

Mary the wisest of mothers, Mary the mother of true wisdom, becomes the scholar or disciple of the Child. For she yielded to Him not as to a boy, nor as to a man, but as unto God. Further, she pondered upon both His divine words and works, so that nothing that was said or done by Him was lost upon her, but as the Word itself was before in her womb, so now she conceived the ways and words of the same, and in a manner nursed them in her heart. And while indeed she thought upon one thing at the time, another she wanted to be more clearly revealed to her; and this was her constant rule and law through her whole life. (Ancient Greek expositor quoted by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aurea on Lk 2:51–52)

…judges Francis’ idea on Grace

  • In order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God’s grace

In order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God – first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act. Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason – the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves ‘the law of sin’ (Rom 7:25). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 109, a. 9)

  • Whoever denies that grace is necessary for salvation ought to be anathematized

Augustine says (De Perfect Just. XXI): ‘Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer ‘Lead us not into temptation’ (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God’s grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 109, a. 8)

  • Humans need divine help – grace – to obtain the ultimate end

No instrument can achieve its ultimate perfection by the power of its own form, but only by the power of the principal agent, although by its own power it can provide a certain disposition to the ultimate perfection. Indeed, the cutting of the lumber results from the saw according to the essential character of its own form, but the form of the bench comes from the skilled mind which uses the tool. Likewise, the breaking down and consumption of food in the animal body is due to the heat of fire, but the generation of flesh, and controlled growth and similar actions, stem from the vegetative soul which uses the heat of fire as an instrument. Now, all intellects and wills are subordinated as instruments under a principal agent to God, Who is the first intellect and will. So, their operations must have no efficacy in regard to the ultimate perfection which is the attainment of final happiness, except through the divine power. Therefore, a rational nature needs divine help to obtain the ultimate end. […] Since what is given a person, without any preceding merit on his part, is said to be given to him gratis, and because the divine help that is offered to man precedes all human merit, as we showed, it follows that this help is accorded gratis to man, and as a result it quite fittingly took the name grace. Hence, the Apostle says, in Romans (Rom 11:6): ‘And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, ch. 147, 150)

  • Eternal life cannot be had except through grace

The free gift [grace] of God is eternal life. For since he had said that just men have eternal life, which it is certain cannot be had except through grace, then the very fact that we do what is good and that our works are worthy of eternal life is the result of God’s grace: ‘He bestows grace and glory’ (Ps 84:11). Thus, therefore, if our works are considered in themselves and as coming from our free will they do not merit eternal life ex condigno, but only as coming from the grace of the Holy Spirit. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, Rom 6:19 – 23)

  • Man cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; he needs the force of grace

Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above (q. 5, a. 5). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life […] ‘It is certain that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God’s grace.’ And it has been said (a. 4), that to fulfill the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 109, a.5)

  • Man by himself cannot rise from sin without the help of grace

If man has a nature, whereby he can he justified, ‘Christ died in vain,’ i.e. to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice. I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (q. 87, a. 6), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above (q. 85, a. 1; q. 86, a. 1; q. 87, a.1), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man’s nature is disordered by man’s will not being subject to God’s; and this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation. Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man’s will can only be subject to God when God draws man’s will to Himself, as stated above (a. 6). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man’s Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 109, a. 7)

  • The effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace – hence there is no remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace

By sinning a man offends God as stated above (q. 71, a. 5). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 113, a. 2)

  • Without grace humans can do absolutely no supernatural good

And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. II) having stated that ‘without grace men can do no good whatever,’ adds: ‘Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know.’ Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above (a.2,3). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 109, a. 4)

  • Those who enslaved themselves to sin through their own fault do not receive grace

But one who submits to Christ’s sacraments obtains grace from his power, so as not to be under the Law but under grace, unless they enslaved themselves to sin through their own fault. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, Rom 6:11 – 18)

…judges Francis’ idea on Faith

  • The cause of faith: God reveals the truth, and moves inwardly to accept it

Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rm 10:15: ‘How shall they preach, unless they be sent?’
As regards the second, viz. man’s assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 6, a. 1)

…judges Francis’ idea on Catholic Faith and Luteran belief

  • The Church is built up with the sacraments: the apostles and successors may not use them to institute another Church nor to deliver another faith

The apostles and their successors are God’s vicars in governing the Church which is built on faith and the sacraments of faith. Wherefore, just as they may not institute another Church, so neither may they deliver another faith, nor institute other sacraments: on the contrary, the Church is said to be built up with the sacraments ‘which flowed from the side of Christ while hanging on the Cross.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 64, a. 2, ad. 3)

  • Whoever receives this sacrament is made one with Christ and incorporated in His members

In this sacrament, as in the others, that which is a sacrament is a sign of the reality of the sacrament. Now there is a twofold reality of this sacrament, as stated above (q. 73, a. 6): one which is signified and contained, namely, Christ Himself; while the other is signified but not contained, namely, Christ’s mystical body, which is the fellowship of the saints. Therefore, whoever receives this sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made one with Christ, and incorporated in His members. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 80, a.4)

  • Eucharistic faith unites the children of the Church to one another

This sacrament has a threefold significance. One with regard to the past, inasmuch as it is commemorative of our Lord’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, as stated above (q. 48, a. 3), and in this respect it is called a ‘Sacrifice.’ With regard to the present it has another meaning, namely, that of Ecclesiastical unity, in which men are aggregated through this Sacrament; and in this respect it is called ‘Communion’ or ‘Synaxis’. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. IV) that ‘it is called Communion because we communicate with Christ through it, both because we partake of His flesh and Godhead, and because we communicate with and are united to one another through it.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 73, a. 4)

  • Baptism exists so that one may be incorporated in Christ by becoming His member – therefore every baptized person has the grave duty to be fully incorporated to His Mystical Body

Men are bound to that without which they cannot obtain salvation. Now it is manifest that no one can obtain salvation but through Christ; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom 5:18): ‘As by the offense of one unto all men unto condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men unto justification of life.’ But for this end is Baptism conferred on a man, that being regenerated thereby, he may be incorporated in Christ, by becoming His member: wherefore it is written (Gal 3:27): ‘As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ.’ Consequently it is manifest that all are bound to be baptized: and that without Baptism there is no salvation for men. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 68, a.1)

  • Two ways of receiving the Eucharist

The answer is that there are two ways of receiving this sacrament, namely, spiritually and sacramentally. Therefore, some receive sacramentally and spiritually, namely, those who receive this sacrament in such a way that they also share in the reality res of the sacrament, namely, charity through which ecclesial unity exists. To such the Lord’s words apply: ‘He that eats me will live because of me.’ But some receive only sacramentally, namely, those who receive this sacrament in such a way that they do not have the res reality of the sacrament, i.e., charity. To these are applied the words spoken here: ‘He that eats and drinks unworthily eats and drinks judgment upon himself.’ Besides these two ways by which the sacrament is taken, there is a third way, by which one eats per accidens, namely, when it is taken not as a sacrament. This can happen in three ways: in one way, as when a believer receives the consecrated host, which he does not believe is consecrated: such a one has the habit of receiving this sacrament, but he does not use it actually as a sacrament. In another way, as when an unbeliever receives the consecrated host, but he has no faith about this sacrament: such a person does not have the habit of using this sacrament. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, no. 698,    1Cor 11:27–34)

…judges Francis’ idea on God’s love for sinners

  • Blasphemy is the disparagement of God’s goodness, and strives to hinder the honor due to Him

The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. I), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness. […] If it is in thought only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. […] He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this is perfect blasphemy. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 13, a.1)

  • Blasphemy is opposed to charity

It is written (Lev 24:16): ‘He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.’ Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin. I answer that, As stated above (I-II q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as stated above (a. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 13, a.2)

  • Blasphemy contains the gravity of unbelief

On Isaiah 18:2, ‘To a terrible people,’ etc. a gloss says: ‘In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight.’ I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated if the will’s detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to the praise of faith. Therefore, since, as stated above (II-II q. 10, a. 33), unbelief is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 13, a.3)

  • Whoever dies in mortal sin bears a will that detests the Divine justice – and for this reason blasphemes

Now those who are in hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God’s justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices. […] Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be blasphemy in him. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 13, a.4)

…judges Francis’ idea on proclaiming the Gospel only with gentleness

  • Those who preach the truth are always inopportune for the evil – preach always nonetheless

We say that the preacher must always preach opportunely, if he adjusts to the rule of the truth, but not to the false esteem of the listeners, who judge the truth as inopportune; because he who preaches the truth is always for the good opportune, [and] for the evil inopportune. ‘Whoever belongs to God hears the words of God; for this reason you do not listen, because you do not belong to God’ (Jn 8:47). ‘How irksome she [Wisdom] is to the unruly! The fool cannot abide her’ (Sir 6:21). If one had to wait for an opportunity to speak only to those who wanted to hear, it would be only of advantage for the just; but it is necessary that at times he also preach to the evil so that they convert. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second Epistle of Timothy, Ch. 4, lec.1)

  • Since some are found to be prone to vice it is necessary to be restrained from evil by force and fear

Man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. […] Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 95, a. 1)

…judges Francis’ idea on proclaiming the Gospel

  • The truth of the divine intellect – criteria for all else that is true – is altogether immutable

Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before (Article [1]); but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. […] Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 16, a. 8)

  • The Church cannot err – such that she might require changing course

The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord’s promise to His disciples (Jn 16:13): ‘When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth’. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q.1, q.9)

…judges Francis’ idea on the ‘Bread of Life’

  • Jesus unites us with Himself in this sacrament through the truth of His Body and Blood

Yet meanwhile in our pilgrimage He does not deprive us of His bodily presence; but unites us with Himself in this sacrament through the truth of His body and blood. Hence (Jn 6:57) he says: ‘He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in him.’ Hence this sacrament is the sign of supreme charity, and the uplifter of our hope, from such familiar union of Christ with us. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 75 a. 1)

  • The entire body of Christ is in the Eucharist

By the power of the sacrament there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. And this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not said: ‘This is My flesh,’ but ‘This is My body.’ Accordingly, when our Lord said (Jn 6:56): ‘My flesh is meat indeed,’ there the word flesh is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of animals, but not on the bones or the like. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q.76 , a 1, sol. 2)

…judges Francis’ idea that Jesus is only mercy

  • Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God’s works

Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God’s works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God’s works. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 21, a. 4)

  • In God, mercy is His desire to dispel the misery of others, whatever be the defect we call by that name

Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Question 6, Article 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 21, a.3)

  • Justice and mercy are so united, that the one ought to be mingled with the other

Justice and mercy are so united, that the one ought to be mingled with the other; justice without mercy is cruelty; mercy without justice, profusion – hence He goes on to the one from the other. (Gloss quoted by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aura in Mt 5:7)

  • The service of God includes rendering to each one his due: justice

The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. […] Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, ‘Rendering to each one his right, since, as Isidore says (Etym. X), ‘a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others.’ […] Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 58, a.1)

  • Justice directs man in his relations with individuals and the community

Justice, as stated above (a. 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 58, a. 5)

  • Mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another’s distress

Mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another’s distress, impelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its name ‘misericordia’ from denoting a man’s compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another’s unhappiness. Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. XIII, 5), ‘happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.’ Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not. (Saint Thomas Aquina. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 30, a. 1)

  • A person is said to be merciful when he endeavors to dispel the misery of another as if it were his

In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 21. a. 3)

  • Mercy may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another

Mercy signifies grief for another’s distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that ‘this movement of the mind’ (viz. mercy) ‘obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.’ And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, 59, A4,5), it follows that mercy is a virtue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 30, a. 3)

…judges Francis’ idea that Koran is a book of peace

  • Concord is the union of appetites among various persons; while, in addition to this, peace is the union of the appetites even each man

Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning. For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal 5:17: ‘The flesh lusteth against the spirit.’ Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man’s heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a.1)

  • To peace is opposed dissension – between a man and himself, or with others

If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement. A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a.1, ad. 2-3)

  • True peace is only in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, which unites and puts to rest all one’s desires

Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis 14:22): ‘Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.’ Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one’s desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Psalm 147:3: ‘Who hath placed peace in thy borders.’ The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3-4)

  • Peace is an important element of friendship

Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above. The first is the result of one’s own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one’s own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity—the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object—the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor’s will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people ‘make choice of the same things’ (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends ‘like and dislike the same things’ (Sallust, Catilin.) (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a. 3)

  • Peace is the work of charity and justice

Peace is the ‘work of justice’ indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is ‘a unitive force’ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite’s inclinations. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a.3, ad. 3)

  • To cause peace is proper to the virtue of charity

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above, there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (q. 28, a. 4). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a. 4)

  • Peace: an act of charity, and its fruit

We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above (q. 69, a. 1-3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a. 4, ad. 1)

  • To love God, the natural qualities alone are insufficient

Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above (a.3). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 109, a. 4, ad. 3)

  • Man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well

And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 109, a. 2)

  • In the state of corrupt nature, man must be cured by God’s grace

But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God’s grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God’s help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 109, a. 3)

  • Man cannot fulfill all the Divine commandments without healing grace

But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfill all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that ‘without grace men can do no good whatever’, adds: ‘Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know.’ Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above (a. 2,3). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 109, a. 4)

  • The written law is given for the correction of the perversion of the human heart, due to which humans esteem as good those things which are naturally evil

The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 109, a. 3)

  • The secondary precepts of the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart by evil persuasions or by vicious customs and corrupt habits

As stated above (a. 4,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men’s hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (q. 77, a. 2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rom 1), were not esteemed sinful. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 109, a. 6)

  • Sin banishes sanctifying grace, without which peace is not real but merely apparent

Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, q. 29, a. 3, ad. 1)

  • The good of virtue and grace is entirely taken away by sin

Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 85, a. 4)

  • After sin, the soul suffers the privation of union with the Divine light

Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 86, a. 2, ad. 1)

  • A Sacrament signifies the grace it communicates

A sacrament properly speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our sanctification, which is Christ’s passion; the form of our sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a reminder of the past, i.e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of that which is effected in us by Christ’s passion, i.e. grace; and a prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 60, a. 3)

  • Forced concord, by fear, is not really peace

For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that ‘peace is tranquillity of order,’ which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1)

…judges Francis’ idea that Jesus came into the world to learn how to be a man

  • Christ came to manifest the truth and free man from sin

Christ’s manner of life had to be in keeping with the end of His Incarnation, by reason of which He came into the world. Now He came into the world, first, that He might publish the truth. thus He says Himself (Jn 18:37): ‘For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth.’ Hence it was fitting not that He should hide Himself by leading a solitary life, but that He should appear openly and preach in public. Wherefore (Lk 4:42, 43) He says to those who wished to stay Him: ‘To other cities also I must preach the kingdom of God: for therefore am I sent.’   Secondly, He came in order to free men from sin; according to 1 Tim 1:15: ‘Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 40, a. 1)

  • Christ’s humility reflects His majesty

Then when he says, who, though he was in the form of God, etc., he proposes the example of Christ. First, he mentions Christ’s majesty; secondly, His humility (Phil 2:7); thirdly, His exaltation (Phil 2:9) […] he commends Christ’s humility as indicated in His passion: first, he shows Christ’s humility; secondly, its manner (Phil 2: 8). Therefore He was man, but very great, because the same one is God and man; yet He humbled himself. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary of the Letter to the Philippians, lec. 2, Phil 2, 5-8)

…judges Francis’ idea that Christians and Muslims share the same faith

  • The theological virtues surpass the nature of man; and makes him a partaker of the Divine Nature

Now man’s happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (q. 5, a. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2Pet 1:4) that by Christ we are made ‘partakers of the Divine nature.’ And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called ‘theological virtues’. […] A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 62, a. 1)

  • The theological virtue of faith is above man’s nature…

That which is above man’s nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man’s nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (q. 58, a. 3). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 62, a. 2)

  • …and has as its object the First Truth

The object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health. […] Things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 1, a. 1)

  • Since it is based on the First Truth, nothing false can come under the infused virtue of Faith

Now it has been stated (a. 1) that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come under faith. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 1, a. 3)

  • Science is not more certain than the infused virtue of Faith; nor is any other human thing

The Apostle says (1Thess 2:15): ‘When you had received of us the word of the hearing,’ i.e. by faith . . . ‘you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God.’ Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 4, a. 8)

  • Unbelief is a sin as it arises from pride, since man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith

Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Isaiah 53:1: ‘Who hath believed our report?’ It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin. If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. […] Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral.31, 45) that ‘presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 10, a. 1)

  • The lack of Faith is the gravest sin

Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above (I-II, q. 71, a. 6; I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 10, a. 3)

  • It is not possible for anyone who has a false opinion of God to know Him at all, because subjective opinion opposes the infused virtue of Faith

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 10, a. 3)

  • Those who lack the virtue of Faith cannot carry out meritorious supernatural acts that lead to eternal life, even though they can do certain natural good deeds

Mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices. Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, An unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief. […] Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 10, a. 4, sol. ad. 2)

  • Prayer in not meritorious without sanctifying grace

Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is ‘a gift of God,’ as Augustine states (De Persever. 23) (Saint Thomas Aquinas. II-II, q. 83, a. 15)

  • Mohammed perverted the Old and New Testament and forbade his followers to read them

Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him [Mohammed] any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be. seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, ch. 6)

  • Mohammed perverted the Old and New Testament and forbade his followers to read them

Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him [Mohammed] any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be. seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, ch. 6)

  • God takes good from the evils we suffer

Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. 26, 9): ‘The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 21, a. 4, ad. 3)

  • Islam permits all kinds of impurity, giving free rein to carnal pleasure

The point is clear in the case of Mohammad. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, ch. 6)

  • One of the errors of the Saracens is to believe that all things follow without any rational plan, from God’s pure will

Thus, a double error is set aside by the foregoing points. There is the mistake of those who believe that all things follow, without any rational plan, from God’s pure will. This is the error of the exponents of the Law of the Moors, as Rabbi Moses says; according to them, it makes no difference whether fire heats or cools, unless God wills it so. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles. Book III, ch. 97)

…judges Francis’ idea on good-will replacing theological investigation

  • Faith professes truth, and reason investigates truth

For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it. Nevertheless, there are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known. […] We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates. This we shall do by bringing forward both demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which were drawn from the books of the philosophers and of the saints, through which truth is strengthened and its adversary overcome [Books I-III]. Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability [Book IV]. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 9, no. 2.3)

  • Only divine knowledge terminates the natural desire of humans for the ultimate end

Moreover, for each effect that he knows, man naturally desires to know the cause. Now, the human intellect knows universal being. So, he naturally desires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in Book Two. Now, a person has not attained his ultimate end until natural desire comes to rest. Therefore, for human happiness which is the ultimate end it is not enough to have merely any kind of intelligible knowledge; there must be divine knowledge, as an ultimate end, to terminate the natural desire. So, the ultimate end of man is the knowledge of God. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles III, Ch. 25, no. 12)

  • Theology, or sacred science, is a science of revelation

It was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: ‘The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee’ (Is 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.1)

  • Sacred doctrine is a science that is more speculative than practical – it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts

Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 1, a. 4)

  • Theology: a speculative science which derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge

Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 1, a. 5)

…judges Francis’ idea on family

  • The Sacrament is a one of the goods of Matrimony – it shows the indivisible union of Christ and His Church

Matrimony has a threefold good. The first is the birth of children and the educating of them to the worship of God. The second is that fidelity which one must render to the other; and the third is that it is a Sacrament, or, in other words, the indivisibility of Matrimony which shows forth the indivisible union of Christ and His Church. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. De Articulis Fidei, part II (Sacraments) – Matrimony)

…judges Francis’ idea on human suffering

  • Dissimulation is a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. All dissimulation is a sin

It belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that which is in one’s mind, so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1, ad 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (q. 110, a. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 111, a. 1)

  • Jesus looked around at them with anger

Looking around at them with anger and grieved at their hardness of heart, he said to the man, ‘Stretch out your hand.’ (Mk 3:5)

  • Jesus entered the temple area and drove out all those engaged in selling and buying there

Jesus entered the temple area and drove out all those engaged in selling and buying there. He overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who were selling doves. And he said to them, “It is written: ‘My house shall be a house of prayer,’ but you are making it a den of thieves.” (Mt 21:12-13)

  • ‘You have made the Father’s house a den of thieves’

They came to Jerusalem, and on entering the temple area he began to drive out those selling and buying there. He overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who were selling doves. He did not permit anyone to carry anything through the temple area. Then he taught them saying, “Is it not written: ‘My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples’? But you have made it a den of thieves.” (Mk 11:13-17)

  • Seeing Jesus’ anger, His disciples recalled the words of scripture, ‘Zeal for your house will consume me’

Since the Passover of the Jews was near, Jesus went up to Jerusalem. He found in the temple area those who sold oxen, sheep, and doves, as well as the money-changers seated there. He made a whip out of cords and drove them all out of the temple area, with the sheep and oxen, and spilled the coins of the money-changers and overturned their tables, and to those who sold doves he said, ‘Take these out of here, and stop making my Father’s house a marketplace.’ His disciples recalled the words of scripture, ‘Zeal for your house will consume me.’ (Jn 2:13-17)

  • Jesus reprimands the evil of the Pharisees

You brood of vipers, how can you say good things when you are evil? For from the fullness of the heart the mouth speaks. (Mt 12:34)

  • Christ’s estimation of the leaders in Israel

Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You lock the kingdom of heaven before human beings. You do not enter yourselves, nor do you allow entrance to those trying to enter. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You traverse sea and land to make one convert, and when that happens you make him a child of Gehenna twice as much as yourselves. Woe to you, blind guides, who say, ‘If one swears by the temple, it means nothing, but if one swears by the gold of the temple, one is obligated.’ Blind fools, which is greater, the gold, or the temple that made the gold sacred? And you say, ‘If one swears by the altar, it means nothing, but if one swears by the gift on the altar, one is obligated.’ You blind ones, which is greater, the gift, or the altar that makes the gift sacred? One who swears by the altar swears by it and all that is upon it; one who swears by the temple swears by it and by him who dwells in it; one who swears by heaven swears by the throne of God and by him who is seated on it. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You pay tithes of mint and dill and cummin, and have neglected the weightier things of the law: judgment and mercy and fidelity. (But) these you should have done, without neglecting the others. Blind guides, who strain out the gnat and swallow the camel! Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You cleanse the outside of cup and dish, but inside they are full of plunder and self-indulgence. Blind Pharisee, cleanse first the inside of the cup, so that the outside also may be clean. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You are like whitewashed tombs, which appear beautiful on the outside, but inside are full of dead men’s bones and every kind of filth. Even so, on the outside you appear righteous, but inside you are filled with hypocrisy and evildoing. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You build the tombs of the prophets and adorn the memorials of the righteous, and you say, ‘If we had lived in the days of our ancestors, we would not have joined them in shedding the prophets’ blood.’ Thus you bear witness against yourselves that you are the children of those who murdered the prophets; now fill up what your ancestors measured out! You serpents, you brood of vipers, how can you flee from the judgment of Gehenna? (Mt 23:13-33)

  • ‘Will you be exalted to heaven? You will go down to the netherworld’

But it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the judgment than for you. And as for you, Capharnaum, ‘Will you be exalted to heaven? You will go down to the netherworld.’ Whoever listens to you listens to me. Whoever rejects you rejects me. And whoever rejects me rejects the one who sent me. (Lk 10:14-16)

  • God punishes to incite repentance

But when we are judged by the Lord, i.e., punished in this world, we are chastened, i.e., this is done for our correction, in order, namely, that each one withdraw from sin on account of the punishment he endured. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians 11:27-34, no. 705)

…judges Francis’ idea on studying theology

  • Because of the height of the doctrine they teach, they should despise earthly things

Because of the height of this doctrine, there is required dignity in those who teach it, which is why they are symbolized by mountains when it is said, ‘from your upper rooms’, and this for three reasons. First, because of the height of mountains. For they are elevated above the earth and neighbours of the sky. Thus the holy teachers by despising earthly things cleave to heavenly things alone. Philippians 3:20: ‘But our citizenship is in heaven from which also we eagerly await a Saviour, Our Lord Jesus Christ.’ Hence of the teacher of teachers, Christ, it is said in Isaiah 2:2, ‘And in the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of the mountain… and all nations shall flow unto it.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Principium Ringans Montes, 2)

  • The theologians are illumined by the first beams of divine wisdom

For the mountains are illumined by beams. Similarly the sacred teachers of minds first receive the splendour. Like mountains the teachers are illumined by the first beams of divine wisdom. Psalm 75:5: ‘You came shining with light, powerful, from the everlasting hills. The foolish of heart have been despoiled,’ that is, by the teachers who participate in eternity. Philippians 2:15: ‘You shine like stars in the world.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Principium Ringans Montes, 2)

  • They must stand against errors in defense of the faith

[…] the doctors of the Church must in defense of the faith stand against errors. The sons of Israel do not put their trust in lance or bow, but the mountains defend them. Ezekiel 13.5: ‘You have not gone up to face the enemy, nor have you set up a wall for the house of Israel to stand in battle in the day of the Lord.’ Therefore all the teachers of Sacred Scripture should give high thanks to their eminence of life, that they might be worthy to preach efficaciously, because as Gregory says in On Pastoral Care, ‘The preaching of those whose life is despised will also be despised.’ Ecclesiastes 12:11: ‘The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails deeply fastened in, which by the counsels of masters are given from one shepherd.’ For the heart cannot be stimulated or stirred to fear of God unless it is fixed in highness of life. They should be enlightened, that they might fittingly teach by reading. Ephesians 3:8-9: ‘Yes, to me, the very least of all the saints, there was given this grace, to announce among the Gentiles the good tidings of the unfathomable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men as to what is the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God.’ Armed, that they might refute errors in disputation. Luke 21:15: ‘For I myself will give you utterance and wisdom, which all your adversaries will not be able to resist.’ Of these three offices, namely, to preach, to lecture and to dispute, it is said in Titus 1:9, ‘that he may be able both to exhort in sound doctrine and to confute opponents’. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Principium Ringans Montes, 2)

  • God is the object of this sacred science

I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. […] but in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.7)

  • In this science all things are dealt with, but only so far as they have reference to God

This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God – that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.7)

…judges Francis’ idea on the formation of youth

  • God alone can satisfy the will of man

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: ‘Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.’ Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 2, a. 8)

…judges Francis’ idea that catholics and muslims adore the same God

  • God is three Persons

The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, ‘The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost’. And because this word ‘God’ can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, ‘The essence is the three persons’; so likewise it is true to say, ‘God is the three persons’. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 39, a. 6)

  • The Mohammedans ridicule the Trinity, and think we are insane for professing three persons in God

The Christian faith principally consists in acknowledging the holy Trinity, and it specially glories in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. […] The following are the things you say the Muslims attack and ridicule: They ridicule the fact that we say Christ is the Son of God, when God has no wife (Qur’ân 6:110; 72:3); and they think we are insane for professing three persons in God, even though we do not mean by this three gods. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium on Reasons for the Faith against Muslim Objections, Ch. 1)

  • True adoration requires the truth of faith

In spirit and in truth [But the hour is coming, and is now here, when true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and in truth. Jn 4:23] can be understood in a third way, as indicating the characteristics of true worship. For two things are necessary for a true worship: one is that the worship be spiritual; […] Secondly, the worship should be in truth. First, in the truth of faith, because no fervent spiritual desire is meritorious unless united to the truth of faith […] This prayer, then, requires three things: first, the fervor of love; secondly, the truth of faith. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Gospel of Saint John, Ch. 4, Lecture 2, no. 611)

  • Since God is absolutely simple, there cannot be false knowledge of him – he who denies that God uis triune neither knows God nor adores Him

As to his saying, ‘You people worship’, [‘what you do not understand’ Jn 4:22] and so on, it should be pointed out that, as the Philosopher says, knowledge of complex things is different than knowledge of simple things. For something can be known about complex things in such a way that something else about them remains unknown; thus there can be false knowledge about them. For example, if someone has true knowledge of an animal as to its substance, he might be in error touching the knowledge of one of its accidents, such as whether it is black or white; or of a difference, such as whether it has wings or is four-footed. But there cannot be false knowledge of simple things: because they are either perfectly known inasmuch as their quiddity is known; or they are not known at all, if one cannot attain to a knowledge of them. Therefore, since God is absolutely simple, there cannot be false knowledge of him in the sense that something might be known about him and something remain unknown, but only in the sense that knowledge of him is not attained. Accordingly, anyone who believes that God is something that he is not, for example, a body, or something like that, does not adore God but something else, because he does not know him, but something else. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Gospel of Saint John, Ch. 4, Lecture 2, no. 603)

  • It is not only necessary to believe in one God, the Creator, but also that God is the Father and that Christ is the true Son of God

It is not only necessary for Christians to believe in one God who is the Creator of heaven and earth and of all things; but also they must believe that God is the Father and that Christ is the true Son of God. This, as Saint Peter says, is not mere fable, but is certain and proved by the word of God on the Mount of Transfiguration. “For we have not by following artificial fables made known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ; but we were eyewitnesses of His greatness. For He received from God the Father honor and glory, this voice coming down to Him from the excellent glory: ‘This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. Listen to Him.’ And this voice, we heard brought from heaven, when we were with Him in the holy mount” (2Pet 1:16). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum The Apostoles’ Creed, a.2)

  • Muslims ridicule us for holding that Christ is the Son of the living God since they are carnal

First of all we must observe that Muslims are silly in ridiculing us for holding that Christ is the Son of the living God, as if God had a wife. Since they are carnal, they can think only of what is flesh and blood. For any wise man can observe that the mode of generation is not the same for everything, but generation applies to each thing according to the special manner of its nature. […] So generation should be understood of God as it applies to an intellectual nature. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium on Reasons for the Faith against Muslim Objections, Ch. 3)

  • God is the highest good

For the universal good stands higher than any particular good, just as ‘the good of the people is better than the good of an individual’, since the goodness and perfection of the whole stand higher than the goodness and perfection of the part. But the divine goodness is compared to all others as the universal good to a particular good, being, as we have shown, the good of every good. God is, therefore, the highest good. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. 41, no. 2)

  • For God does things because He wills so to do, according to His nature

For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1)

  • Voluntarism is an error – The end of the divine will is its goodness

For to the will the cause of its willing is the end. But the end of the divine will is its goodness. Hence, it is the cause of God’s willing, just as it is also His act of will. […] Through the foregoing is set aside the error of certain persons who said that all things proceed from God according to His simple will, which means that we are not to give an explanation of anything except that God wills it. This view is likewise opposed to Sacred Scripture, which proclaims that God made all things according to the order of His wisdom, as is said in the Psalm (103:24): ‘You made all things in wisdom’. And in Sirach (1:10) it is said that God ‘poured’ His wisdom ‘out upon all His works’. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. 87, nos. 2.5-6)

  • Therefore God cannot will evil

For the virtue of a being is that by which he operates well. Now every operation of God is an operation of virtue, since His virtue is His essence, as was shown above. Therefore, God cannot will evil.
Again, the will never aims at evil without some error existing in the reason, at least with respect to a particular object of choice. For, since the object of the will is the apprehended good, the will cannot aim at evil unless in some way it is proposed to it as a good; and this cannot take place without error. But in the divine knowledge there cannot be error, as was shown above. God’s will cannot, therefore, tend towards evil.
Moreover, God is the highest good, as has been shown. But the highest good cannot bear any mingling with evil, as neither can the highest hot thing bear any mingling with the cold. The divine will, therefore, cannot be turned to evil. Furthermore, since the good has the nature of an end, evil cannot enter the will except by turning away from the end. But the divine will cannot be turned from the end, since it can will nothing except by willing itself. Therefore, it cannot will evil. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. 95, no. 2-5)

  • God cannot will something that is opposed to the nature of being as such – He cannot will anything implying a contradiction

Again, as was shown above, in willing His own being, which is His own goodness, God wills all other things in so far as they bear His likeness. But in so far as a thing is opposed to the nature of being as such, there cannot be preserved in it the likeness of the first being, namely, the divine being, which is the source of being. Hence, God cannot will something that is opposed to the nature of being as such. But just as it is opposed to the nature of man as man to be irrational, so it is opposed to the nature of being as such that something be at once being and nonbeing. God, therefore, cannot will. But this is included in everything that is of itself impossible, which has an opposition with itself as implying a contradiction. The will of God, therefore, cannot be of that which is of itself impossible. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. 84, no. 3)

  • It is incompatible with God to cause anyone to sin

Besides, all wisdom and goodness in man are derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, as a certain likeness of Him. But it is incompatible with human wisdom and goodness to cause anyone to sin; much more, then, is it incompatible with these divine qualities. […] Hence, it is said in Sirach (Sir 15:12): ‘Say not: He caused me to err. For He has no need of wicked men’. And later: ‘He commanded no man to act wickedly, and He has given no man license to sin’ (Sir 15:21). And in James (Jas 1:13) it is said: ‘Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils’. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, Book 3, Ch. 162, nos. 4.6)

  • God preserves the order of justice and of nature

God’s Providence does not destroy the nature and order of things, but preserves them. So God’s wisdom was most evident in his preserving the order of justice and of nature. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium on Reasons for the Faith against Muslim Objections, Ch. 7)

  • Because of the uncontainable will of Allah, what is left to man? Fatalism

Concerning merit, which depends on free will, you assert that the Muslims and other nations hold that God’s fore-knowledge or decree imposes necessity on human actions; thus they say that man cannot die or even sin unless God decrees this, and that every person has his destiny written on his forehead. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium on Reasons for the Faith against Muslim Objections, Ch. 1)

  • God is not subject to caprice or impulse; His will is entirely unchangeable

The will of God is entirely unchangeable. […] whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (9, 1; 14, 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 19, a. 7)

  • Human felicity is not in bodily pleasures, which the followers of Mohammed seek as their reward

Furthermore, the highest perfection of man cannot lie in a union with things inferior to himself, but, rather, in a union with some reality of a higher character, for the end is better than that which is for the sake of the end. Now, the aforementioned pleasures consist in this fact: that man is, through his senses, united with some things that are his inferiors, that is, with certain sensible objects. So, felicity is not to be located in pleasures of this sort. […] Furthermore, the ultimate end of everything is God, as is clear from what has been indicated earlier. So, we should consider the ultimate end of man to be that whereby be most closely approaches God. But, through the aforesaid pleasures, man is kept away from a close approach to God, for this approach is effected through contemplation, and the aforementioned pleasures are the chief impediment to contemplation, since they plunge man very deep into sensible things, consequently distracting him from intelligible objects. Therefore, human felicity must not be located in bodily pleasures. […] Refuted, too, are the fables of the Jews and the Saracens, who identified the rewards for just men with these pleasures, for felicity is the reward for virtue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Suma contra gentiles, Book 3, Ch. 27, nos. 6.10.13)

  • The good that God derives from an evil he permits is always greater than the privation of good by the evil permitted

It is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good […] Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 19, a. 9)

  • If the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, it is both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away

We observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since ‘a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump’ (1Cor 5:6). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 64, a. 2)

  • Inasmuch as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe, God is said to hate the things whose punishment He wills

However, God is said by similitude to hate some things, and this in a twofold way. In the first way, because God, in loving things and by willing the existence of their good, wills the non-existence of the contrary evil. Hence, He is said to have a hatred of evils, for we are said to hate what we will not to exist. In the words of Zechariah (8:17): ‘And let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his friend and love not a false oath. For all these are the things that I hate, says the Lord.’ These, however, are not effects in the manner of subsisting things, to which properly love and hate refer. The second way arises from the fact that God wills some greater good that cannot be without the loss of some lesser good. And thus He is said to hate, although this is rather to love. For thus, inasmuch as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe, which cannot exist without the punishment or corruption of some things, God is said to hate the things whose punishment or corruption He wills. In the words of Malachi (1:3): ‘I have hated Esau’; and the Psalms (5:7): ‘You hate all workers of iniquity: You destroy all who speak a lie. The bloody and the deceitful man the Lord will abhor.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. 96)

…judges Francis’ idea on human suffering

  • Death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin

One thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that ‘by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon.’ In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in human nature […] Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers […] so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 85, a. 2)

  • Sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil

Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man’s greatest evil. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 39, a. 4)

  • There is no virtue that did not have its example on the Cross

There is no virtue that did not have its example on the Cross. So if you seek an example of charity, then, ‘greater love than this no one has, than to lay down his life for his friends’ (Jn 15:13). And this Christ did upon the Cross. If, therefore, He gave His life or us, we ought to endure any and all evils for Him: ‘What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He has done for me?’ (Ps 15:12). If you seek an example of patience, you will find it in its highest degree upon the Cross. Great patience is exemplified in two ways: either when one suffers intensely in all patience, or when one suffers that which he could avoid if he so wished. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, The Apostles Creed. Article 4)

  • The fullness of all grace and knowledge

The fullness of all grace and knowledge was due to Christ’s soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fullness of knowledge and wisdom absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in order to satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to Him of Himself. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 14, a.4, ad 2)

…judges Francis’ idea that man is the center of christian life

  • The love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor

Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?

The root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (q 25, a. 1), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (q. 27, a. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God’s sake. […] On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is ‘busy about much serving’ (Lk 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): ‘The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress of present work’, by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, ‘while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest’, i.e. the contemplation of God. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 182, a. 2)

…judges Francis’ idea on selling off churches to feed the poor

  • Perfection consists not in poverty but in following Christ

Perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Mt 19,27): “Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which is perfect, namely, ‘We have followed Thee,’” while poverty is like an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll 1,7) the abbot Moses says: ‘Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and privation of all one’s possessions are not perfection, but means of perfection.’ Now the privation of one’s possessions, or poverty, is a means of perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 188, a. 7)

  • Perfection can also coexist with great opulence: Abraham was rich

The perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said (Gen 17:1): ‘Walk before Me and be perfect,’ is stated to have been rich (Gen 13:2). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 185, ad. 1)

  • Nothing prevents a vice from arising out of poverty

And since neither riches, nor poverty, nor any external thing is in itself man’s good, but they are only so as they are ordered to the good of reason, nothing prevents a vice from arising out of any of them, when they do not come within man’s use in accord with the rule of reason. Yet they are not to be judged evil in themselves; rather, the use of them may be evil. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III, Ch. 134, no. 6)

…judges Francis’ idea on material charity

  • Corporal alms-deeds are not superior to spiritual ones

There are two ways of comparing these alms-deeds. First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual alms-deeds hold the first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to Proverbs 4:2 – ‘I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law.’ Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 32, a.3, co.)

  • Theology is the most important science

Since this science [theology] is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 1, a.5, co.)

…judges Francis’ criteria for the nomination of Bishops

  • He who chooses for the episcopate whom he prefers and not those who are more useful to the Church, commits a grave sin

Hence Jerome, commenting on Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that ‘some seek to erect as pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics.’ Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [Ep. 167 ad Hieron] on James 2:1, ‘Brethren, have not… respect of persons,’ says: ‘If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to ‘have the faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.’ For who would suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church’s seat of honor, in despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?’[…] This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastor. 2, 1) ‘the occupations of a prelate ought to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd’s life excels that of his flock.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 185, a. 3)

  • Doctrine is the first, for it is proper to the prelate

He then says: Since you are young of age, ‘show yourself to be a model in good works’; because the prelate should be an living example for his disciples. ‘Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ’ (1Cor 11:1), ‘I have given you a model to follow, so that as I have done for you, you should also do’ (Jn 13:15). In saying then ‘in doctrine’, he resumes in which things, especially he is to show himself an example. Doctrine is the first, for it is proper to the prelate shepherd wisely and prudently’ (Jer 3:15). […] He then shows what is to be his doctrine and words, and says that they should be healthful, not corrupt with falsehoods (2Tim 1): ‘Take as your norm the sound words that you heard from me’ etc. (Prov 17:7): ‘lying ords are out of place in the mouth of the prince’. Also, as for the mode, saying ‘irreprehensible’, that is, that it may be said timely, with all decency, and inducing correction. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Letter to Titus, Chapter 2, lect. 2)

  • It is necessary for the bishop to be well versed and instructed, to shepherd his flock with true doctrine and protect it from heretics

The material for study should not be fables nor temporal banalities, but rather the faithful word, that is true (Ps144), or of the Faith, in which it is necessary for the bishop to be well versed and instructed. But some study just to learn and to make effective that which they learned: but this is not sufficient for the bishop, for the bishop it is necessary to communicate to others what he learned this is why he says: ‘as they have taught him’. […] The utility of this faculty is to fulfill his function, and the office of the prelate is like that of a pastor (Jn 21) who has to shepherd the flock (1Pet5) and ward off the wolf; so also the bishop should shepherd his flock with true doctrine (Jer 3); so he says: ‘so that he may be capable to instruct in the true doctrine’. He does not say exhort and instruct, but rather that he may be capable of doing so when it be necessary […]Also to protect the flock from the heretics: so says: ‘and contest to those who contradict’, that is, convince. And this is achieved by the study of the Sacred Scripture, as is said in 2Tim 3:16: ‘All scripture is inspired by God and is useful for teaching, for refutation’. And these two things, in the Philosopher’s opinion, pertain to the work of the wise man, namely, tell no lies, and unmask the one who tells lies. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Letter to Titus, Chapter 1, lect. 3)

  • Prelates are worthy of as many deaths as the many examples of damnation they pass on

Prelates should know that they are worthy of as many deaths as the many examples of damnation they pass on’ (Saint Gregory the Great); […]. – But it seems that a person must render an account for himself only: ‘All of us must be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that everyone may receive the proper things of the body’ (2 Cor 5:10). I answer that everyone will give an account mainly for his own deeds, but he will give an account for others to the extent that his acts pertain to others. But the acts of prelates pertain to others according to Ezekiel (3:17); ‘Son of man, I have made you a watchman to the house of Israel; and you shall hear the word from out of my mouth and shall tell it to them.’ Then he continues that if the prelate, who is understood by the name of the watchman, has not told it to the wicked, the wicked man will, of course, die in his sin, but his blood will be required at the hand of the watchman. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. 13, lec. 3: Hb 13, 17-25)

…judges Francis’ prayer in the ecumenical and interreligious Meeting in Sarajevo

  • To unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ

The office of a mediator is to join together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes are united in the mean [medio]. Now to unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to 2 Corinthians 5:19: ‘God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.’ And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God. Hence the Apostle, after saying, ‘Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus,’ added: ‘Who gave Himself a redemption for all.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 26, a. 1)

…judges Francis’ idea that Christians should always humble themselves

  • Christ’s humility is the more wondrous as His majesty is the more sublime

Therefore, although the virtue of humility was not fitting to Christ in His divine nature, it was fitting to Him in His human nature, and His humility was Tendered the more praiseworthy by His divinity. For the dignity of the person contributes to the praise humility deserves; for example, when out of some necessity a great man has to suffer something lowly. But there can be no dignity of man so great as this: that he be God. Hence, the humility of the God-man was praiseworthy in the extreme when He bore those abject things which He was called on to suffer for the salvation of men. For men were by reason of pride lovers of worldly glory. Therefore, to change the spirits of men over from love of worldly glory to love of divine glory He willed to bear death—not just any sort of death, but a death abject in the extreme. For there are some who, although they do not fear death, abhor an abject death. And even to the contempt of such a death did our Lord inspire men by the example of His death. […] Hence, although many examples of humility of other men are discoverable, it was most expeditious to arouse men to humility by the example of the God-man. He clearly could not make a mistake, and His humility is the more wondrous as His majesty is the more sublime. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa against the Gentiles, Book IV, Ch.55, no. 20-21)

  • Outward signs and pretense: no more than false humility and grievous pride

Humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is ‘false humility,’ of which Augustine says in a letter (Ep. 149) that it is ‘grievous pride,’ since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad 2)

…judges Francis’ idea on asking prayers from non-catholics and atheists

  • The Lord hears every petition which is offered by those united the Church

But He holds out a ratification not only of sentences of excommunication, but of every petition which is offered by men holding together in the unity of the Church; for He adds, ‘Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree upon earth,’ whether in admitting a penitent, or casting out a forward person, ‘touching anything which they shall ask,’ anything, that is, that is not against the unity of the Church, ‘it shall be done for them by my Father which is in heaven.’ By saying, ‘which is in heaven,’ He points Him out as above all, and therefore able to fulfill all that shall be asked of Him. Or, He is in the heavens, that is, with saints, proof enough that whatever worthy thing they shall ask shall be done unto them, because they have with them Him of whom they ask. For this cause is the sentence of those that agree together ratified, because God dwells in them, ‘For where two or more are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aurea 4818, Matthew 18:18-20)

  • Prayer is not meritorious without sanctifying grace

Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is ‘a gift of God,’ as Augustine states (De Persever. 23). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 83, a. 15)

…judges Francis’ idea on capital punishment

  • The slaying of evil-doers is not contrary to the precept of the Decalogue

The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. I, 4). In like manner when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 100, a. 8, ad. 3)

  • The capital penalty must be applied to safeguard the common good

Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since ‘a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump’ (1Cor 5:6). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q.64, a.2)

  • Human justice should imitate divine justice

According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q.64, a.2, ad 2)

  • Both Divine and human laws command such sinners to be put to death out of the love of charity

It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q.25, a.6, ad 2)

…judges Francis’ vision on the divorced who re-marry

  • Adultery is always a mortal sin

Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [‘Ex genere,’ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 72, a. 5)

  • God dwells in righteous bodies; and death in the sinner’s body

God Himself dwells in righteous bodies. But the bodies of sinners are called sepulchres of the dead, because the sinner’s soul is dead in his body; for that cannot be deemed to be alive, which does no spiritual or living act. (Saint Thomas Aquinas, citing Pseudo-Chrysostom, in the Catena Aurea, Matthew 23: 27-28)

  • Mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace

Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace […] (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 87, a. 4)

  • An adulterer destroys his own soul

First of all, because they destroy the soul: ‘He who is an adulterer has no sense, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul’ (Prov 6:32). It says: ‘for the folly of his heart,’ which is whenever the flesh dominates the spirit. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 8)

  • Prayer is not meritorious without sanctifying grace

Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is ‘a gift of God,’ as Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 83, a. 15)

  • In all things, we should seek that the sinner be loosened from sin

But, like a vessel that has lost its rudder is tossed at the mercy of the storm, so man, when by sin he has forfeited the aid of Divine grace, no longer acts as he wills, but as the Devil wills. And if God, by the mighty arm of His mercy, do not loose him, he will abide till death in the chain of his sins. Therefore He saith to His disciples, ‘Loose them,’ that is, by your teaching and miracles, for all the Jews and Gentiles were loosed by the Apostles; ‘and bring them to me,’ that is, convert them to My glory.(Saint Thomas Aquinas, citing Pseudo-Chrysostom, in the Catena Aurea Mt 21:1-9)

  • Fraternal correction is an act of charity

The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should be employed against a man’s sin. Now a man’s sin may be considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by that man’s sin, Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone’s evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person’s good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well. Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because thereby we drive out our brother’s evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice between one man and another. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II. q. 33, a.1)

  • The good physician removes the very root of the illness

The good physician removes the external symptoms of a malady; and, furthermore, he even removes the very root of the illness, so that there will be no relapse. So also the Lord wishes us to avoid the beginnings of sins […]. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 7)

  • He who is not punished now bodily, shall be punished in the future life

Secondly, they deprive one of life; for one guilty of such should die according to the Law, as we read in Leviticus (20:10) and Deuteronomy (22:22). Sometimes the guilty one is not punished now bodily, which is to his disadvantage since punishment of the body may be borne with patience and is conducive to the remission of sins; but nevertheless he shall be punished in the future life. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Ten Commandments, Article 8)

  • Out of charity, we ought to love more those who are nearer to God

Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others? […] Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 26, a. 6)

…judges Francis’ idea comparing Catechesis with Yoga and Zen

  • Man’s whole salvation depends upon the knowledge of divine truths

Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 1, a.1)

…judges Francis’ idea on divorcees as Godparents

  • The baptized child is bound by another in things necessary for salvation

He who answers in the child’s stead: ‘I do believe,’ does not foretell that the child will believe when it comes to the right age, else he would say: ‘He will believe’; but in the child’s stead he professes the Church’s faith which is communicated to that child, the sacrament of which faith is bestowed on it, and to which faith he is bound by another. For there is nothing unfitting in a person being bound by another in things necessary for salvation. In like manner the sponsor, in answering for the child, promises to use his endeavors that the child may believe. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 71, a. 1)

  • Duty of instructing in the mode of Christian life

Instruction is manifold. […] A third is instruction in the mode of Christian life: and this belongs to the sponsors. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 71, a. 4, ad. 3)

…judges Francis’ ideas on the Church closed and ailing

  • The necessity to avoid the society of sinners as regards fellowship in sin

Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one’s father or mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. […] As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more. […] We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (Jer 15:19): ‘They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not to be turned to them.’ The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matthew 9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor 6:17): ‘Go out from among them and touch not the unclean thing,’ i.e. by consenting to sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 25, a. 6)

 …judges Francis’ ideas on Laudate Si’

  • The justification of the ungodly is greater than the creation of heaven and earth

A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that ‘for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth,’ adds, ‘for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 113, a. 9)

  • Greater than the good of nature in the whole universe: the good of grace in one person

But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2)

…judges Francis’ idea that the Pope should not judge

  • Scandal may induce spiritual ruin due to a lack of rectitude

As Jerome observes the Greek skandalon may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a skandalon. In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called. Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall, except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as ‘something less rightly done or said, that occasions another’s spiritual downfall.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 43, a.1)

  • Unnatural vice transgresses what has been determined by nature, is gravest of all, and an injury to God the Author of nature

In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. […] Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 154, a. 12; ad 1)

…judges Francis’ idea on reducing the precepts of the Church

  • Context of the first citation of Aquinas: His words refer strictly to the ontological field, not to the logical, ideological, philosophical or theological fields

It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, ‘God saw the light that it was good’ (Gen 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, ‘God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good’ (Gen 1:31). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 47, a. 2, ad 2 – cf. I, q. 47, a. 1 and I, q. 47, a. 3)

  • The reason why the ontological meaning of Saint Thomas’ words should not be applied to the theological field – even through analogy – is due to the fact that the criteria of sacred doctrine is not human but divine

It was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason […] But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 1, a. 1)

  • Since theology – which constitutes the greatest wisdom – may not irrationally contain a fusion of truth and error, different lines of thought may not be reconciled

Truth must consequently be the ultimate end of the whole universe, and the consideration of the wise man aims principally at truth. So it is that, according to His own statement, divine Wisdom testifies that He has assumed flesh and come into the world in order to make the truth known: ‘For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth’ (Jn 18:37). The Philosopher himself establishes that first philosophy is the science of truth, not of any truth, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, namely, which belongs to the first principle whereby all things are. The truth belonging to such a principle is, clearly, the source of all truth; for things have the same disposition in truth as in being. It belongs to one and the same science, however, both to pursue one of two contraries and to oppose the other. Medicine, for example, seeks to effect health and to eliminate illness. Hence, just as it belongs to the wise man to meditate especially on the truth belonging to the first principle and to teach it to others, so it belongs to him to refute the opposing falsehood. Appropriately, therefore, is the twofold office of the wise man shown from the mouth of Wisdom in our opening words: to meditate and speak forth of the divine truth, which is truth in person (Wisdom touches on this in the words my mouth shall meditate truth), and to refute the opposing error (which Wisdom touches on in the words and my lips shall hate impiety). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. I)

  • Contrary to certain relativistic tendencies of our days, Saint Thomas firmly countered and rejected any line of thought not inspired by Revelation or faithful to it

For these ‘secrets of divine Wisdom’ (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge, it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability of all nature. […] When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of the abovementioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms or the promise of pleasure, and (what is most wonderful of all) in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that surpass every human intellect; the pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should seek only what is invisible. […]On the other hand, those who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines proceeded in a way that is opposite to this, The point is clear in the case of Muhammad. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. As for proofs of the truth of his doctrine, he brought forward only such as could be grasped by the natural ability of anyone with a very modest wisdom. Indeed, the truths that he taught he mingled with many fables and with doctrines of the greatest falsity. He did not bring forth any signs produced in a supernatural way, which alone fittingly gives witness to divine inspiration; for a visible action that can be only divine reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of truth. On the contrary, Muhammad said that he was sent in the power of his arms—which are signs not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. What is more, no wise men, men trained in things divine and human, believed in him from the beginning, Those who believed in him were brutal men and desert wanderers, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, through whose numbers Muhammad forced others to become his followers by the violence of his arms. Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. VI)

  • To seek reconciliation between different lines of thought, which are necessarily opposed to each other in at least one aspect – so that they are in fact diverse – is to impede the ability of grasping the truth

That which we hold by faith as divinely revealed, therefore, cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge. Again. In the presence of contrary arguments our intellect is chained, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If, therefore, contrary knowledge were implanted in us by God, our intellect would be hindered from knowing truth by this very fact. Now, such an effect cannot come from God. And again. What is natural cannot change as long as nature does not. Now, it is impossible that contrary opinions should exist in the same knowing subject at the same time. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book 1, Ch. VII)

  • The context of the second citation of Aquinas: It evolves as a comparison between the New and Old Law; it’s not a question of a vindication of greater rights or fewer duties. Saint Thomas Aquinas explains that the New Law is lighter than the Old because it added few precepts to the natural law

A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, ‘whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave’s burden; so much so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable.’

The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old; because the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous. Accordingly we read also (1 Jn 5:3) that ‘His commandments are not heavy’: which words Augustine expounds by saying that ‘they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that loveth not.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 107, a. 4)

  • The intention of Aquinas in using the doctrine of Augustine is to point out the essence of the New Law, which consists principally in grace and secondarily in the ordered precepts to receive and make use of them

‘Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it,’ as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom 3:27): ‘Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith’: for he calls the grace itself of faith ‘a law.’ And still more clearly it is written (Rom 8:2): ‘The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death.’ Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that ‘as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful’: and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): ‘What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but the very presence of His Holy Spirit?’ Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them, both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that secondarily it is a written law. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 106, a. 1)

  • Neither Augustine of Hippo nor Thomas Aquinas are diminishing the importance of the precepts of the New Law; they are merely seeking to demonstrate that these are not its essence, since they do not have the capacity to justify man

As stated above (Article [1]), there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spiritu et Littera xvii): ‘There,’ i.e. in the Old Testament, ‘the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid’; ‘here,’ i.e. in the New Testament, ‘it is given in an inward manner, that they may be justified.’ The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2Cor 3:6) ‘The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth’: and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 106, a. 2)

  • The fact that the essence of the New Law is grace – through which man is justified – does not mean that certain exterior acts should not be prohibited for the good of the faithful

The New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this grace through God’s Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn 1:14): ‘The Word was made flesh,’ and afterwards: ‘full of grace and truth’; and further on: ‘Of His fulness we all have received, and grace for grace.’ Hence it is added that ‘grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.’ Consequently it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like. In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written (Mt 10:32,33) ‘(Every one) that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father.’ On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must do or avoid. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 108. a. 1)

  • Consequently, not only are the ecclesiastical precepts added to the New Law appropriate, but it is also the duty of the prelates to require that these laws – referring to the spiritual order – be observed

Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in spiritual goods. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 147, a. 3)

…judges Francis’ idea on equality as the source of justice and happiness

  • Diversity and inequality in created things are the intention of God Himself

The highest degree of perfection should not be lacking in a work made by the supremely good workman. But the good of order among diverse things is better than any of the members of an order, taken by itself. For the good of order is formal in respect to each member of it, as the perfection of the whole in relation to the parts. It was not fitting, therefore, that God’s work should lack the good of order. And yet, without the diversity and inequality of created things, this good could not exist. To sum up: The diversity and inequality in created things are not the result of chance, nor of a diversity of matter, nor of the intervention of certain causes or merits, but of the intention of God Himself, who wills to give the creature such perfection as it is possible for it to have. Accordingly, in the Book of Genesis (Gen 1:31) it is said: ‘God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good,’ each one of them having been previously said to be good. For each thing in its nature is good, but all things together are very good, by reason of the order of the universe, which is the ultimate and noblest perfection in things. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, Book II, Ch. 45)

…judges Francis’ idea on the immortality of the soul

  • The soul separated from the body is a part of the human species…

The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 29, q. 1, ad. 5)

  • it is immortal and everlasting…

Because that alone in our soul which belongs to the intellect in act is separate and uses no organ; I mean that part of the soul whereby we understand actually and which includes the possible and agent intellect. And that is why Aristotle goes on to say that this part of the soul alone is immortal and everlasting, as being independent of the body in virtue of its separateness. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, bk. II, Ch. 78, no. 12)

  • The soul is subsistent and caused through creation by God

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Question 75, Article 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 118, a. 2)

  • God’s great patience will make His sentence more just and more merited the chastisement

For great wrath ought to be preceded by great forbearance, that the sentence of God may be made more just, and the death of the sinners more merited. God does not know sinners because they are not worthy that they should be known of God; not that He altogether is ignorant concerning them, but because He knows them not for His own. For God knows all men according to nature, but He seems not to know them for that He loves them not, as they seem not to know God who do not serve Him worthily.[…] For death separates the soul from the body, but changes not the purpose of the heart. (Pseudo-Chrysostom in: Saint Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aurea, Mt 7:21-23)

…judges Francis’ idea on God’s omnipotence

  • God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely

It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. […] The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, q. 25, a. 3)

  • To create can be the action of God alone

It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes (Article 1), that to create can be the action of God alone. […] And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. IV, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power. But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally—that is, ministerially. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 45, a. 5)

…judges Francis’ idea on religious liberty

  • He who drinks the chalice of the demons becomes one with them

He [St. Paul] shows that the first motive for which they should be careful to abstain from eating the offerings immolated to the idols: Holy Communion; whereby what he is going to say he submits to their judgment, he shows, in the second place what it means to make ourselves one with Christ by means of Eucharistic Communion; and thirdly, he proves that this is so, that effectively we are one in his mystical body. […] He reasoning is, then, of this nature: just as he who drinks the chalice of the Lord becomes one with him, in the same way, he who drinks the chalice of the demons becomes one with them. But if there is something that above all should be fled from, it is union with the demons. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, cap. 10, lec. 4: 1 Cor 10:14-17 – rep. Pet. Tar.)

…judges Francis’ idea on the multiplication of the loaves

  • The miracles of Christ showed that His supernatural doctrine was from God

God enables man to work miracles for two reasons. First and principally, in confirmation of the doctrine that a man teaches. […] Secondly, in order to make known God’s presence in a man by the grace of the Holy Ghost: so that when a man does the works of God we may believe that God dwells in him by His grace. Wherefore it is written (Gal. 3:5): ‘He who giveth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you.’ Now both these things were to be made known to men concerning Christ—namely, that God dwelt in Him by grace, not of adoption, but of union: and that His supernatural doctrine was from God. And therefore it was most fitting that He should work miracles. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q.43, a.1)

  • The multiplication of the loaves was not effected by way of creation, but by an addition of extraneous matter

The multiplication of the loaves was not effected by way of creation, but by an addition of extraneous matter transformed into loaves; hence Augustine says on Jn 6:1-14: ‘Whence He multiplieth a few grains into harvests, thence in His hands He multiplied the five loaves’: and it is clearly by a process of transformation that grains are multiplied into harvests. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 44, a.4, ad.4)

…judges Francis’ idea on our sins drawing us close to Jesus

  • Faith cannot co-exist even with sin

But the faith through which we are cleansed from sin is not ‘lifeless faith,’ which can exist even with sin, but ‘faith living’ through charity; that thus Christ’s Passion may be applied to us, not only as to our minds, but also as to our hearts. And even in this way sins are forgiven through the power of the Passion of Christ. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 5)

  • Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act

Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 71, a. 4)

  • Mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace

Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace […]. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. III, Summa Theologica, q. 87, a. 4)

  • Charity and wisdom are incompatible with mortal sin

The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (a 1), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity, as stated above (a 2; q 23, a 5). Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with mortal sin, as shown above (q 24, a 12). Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 45, a. 4)

  • There are two ways of receiving the Eucharist: one to life, the other to death

The answer is that there are two ways of receiving this sacrament, namely, spiritually and sacramentally. Therefore, some receive sacramentally and spiritually, namely, those who receive this sacrament in such a way that they also share in the reality [res] of the sacrament, namely, charity through which ecclesial unity exists. To such the Lord’s words apply: ‘He that eats me will live because of me.’ But some receive only sacramentally, namely, those who receive this sacrament in such a way that they do not have the [res] reality of the sacrament, i.e., charity. To these are applied the words spoken here: ‘He that eats and drinks unworthily eats and drinks judgment upon himself.’ Besides these two ways by which the sacrament is taken, there is a third way, by which one eats per accidens, namely, when it is taken not as a sacrament. This can happen in three ways: in one way, as when a believer receives the consecrated host, which he does not believe is consecrated: such a one has the habit of receiving this sacrament, but he does not use it actually as a sacrament. In another way, as when an unbeliever receives the consecrated host, but he has no faith about this sacrament. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, lec. 7: 1Cor 11:27-34)

…judges Francis’ idea on knowing God’s will from the people

  • He who preaches the truth is always inopportune for the evil

We say that the preacher must always preach in an opportune manner, if he does so according to the rule of the truth, but not if he bases himself on the false esteem of his listeners, who will judge the truth to be inopportune; for he who preaches the truth is always opportune for the good, and inopportune for the evil. ‘Whoever belongs to God hears the words of God; for this reason you do not listen, because you do not belong to God’ (Jn 8: 47). ‘How irksome she is to the unruly! The fool cannot abide her’ (Sir 6:21). If one had to wait for the opportunity to speak only to those who wished to hear, it would only be of benefit to the just; but it is necessary in a timely way to also preach to the evil so that they convert. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second Epistle to Timothy, ch. 4, lec.1)

…judges Francis’ idea on the essence of divinity

  • God is the Father, and Christ is the true Son of God

It is not only necessary for Christians to believe in one God who is the Creator of heaven and earth and of all things; but also they must believe that God is the Father and that Christ is the true Son of God. […] in the [Nicene] Creed of the Fathers it is said: “God of God; Light of Light,” that is, we are to believe in God the Son from God the Father, and the Son who is Light from the Father who is Light. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. In Symbolum Apostolorum, a. 2)

  • We believe through faith now that which we shall see in the eternal life

We must believe that Christ is the Only-begotten of God, and the true Son of God, who always was with the Father, and that there is one Person of the Son and another of the Father who have the same divine nature. All this we believe now through faith, but we shall know it with a perfect vision in the life eternal. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. In Symbolum Apostolorum, a. 2)

  • Grave error: that God is the formal being of all things. He is in all things not as a part of it, but as the Cause

God is not the formal being of all things. We are now able to refute the error of certain persons who said that God is nothing other than the formal being of each thing. […] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, bk. I, ch. 26, no. 13)

…judges Francis’ idea on the flesh of Christ and poverty as a theological category

  • Riches are good if they advance the practice of virtue; poverty is praiseworthy if it frees from vices

Therefore, riches are good, to the extent that they advance the practice of virtue, but if this measure is departed from, so that the practice of virtue is hindered by them, then they are not to be numbered among goods, but among evils. […] So, poverty is praiseworthy according as it frees man from the vices in which some are involved through riches. Moreover, in so far as it removes the solicitude which arises from riches, it is useful to some, namely, those disposed to busy themselves with better things. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles. bk. III, ch. 133, nos. 1,3)

  • Poverty and riches are not to be judged evil in themselves; the use of them may be evil

And since neither riches, nor poverty, nor any external thing is in itself man’s good, but they are only so as they are ordered to the good of reason, nothing prevents a vice from arising out of any of them, when they do not come within man’s use in accord with the rule of reason. Yet they are not to be judged evil in themselves; rather, the use of them may be evil. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles, bk. III, ch. 134, no. 6)

  • The sacraments of the Church bestow us with the virtue of Christ’s Passion

The sacraments of the Church derive their power specially from Christ’s Passion, the virtue of which is in a manner united to us by our receiving the sacraments. It was in sign of this that from the side of Christ hanging on the Cross there flowed water and blood, the former of which belongs to Baptism, the latter to the Eucharist, which are the principal sacraments. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 62, a.5)

  • The members form one mystic person with the Head, Christ

The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ’s satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 48, a.2, ad 1)

…judges Francis’ idea on the origin of the Psalms

  • The Old Law is like a pedagogue of children; the New Law is the law of perfection

As stated above (q. 90, a. 2; q. 91, a. 4), every law ordains human conduct to some end. […] Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends […]Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another, through one of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely […] We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same end, namely, man’s subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to Romans 3:30: ‘It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith.’ According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col 3:14) that it is ‘the bond of perfection.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 107, a. 1)

  • The New Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ’s Passion, thus giving what the Old Law promised

Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as was stated above (q. 92, q.1): and consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ’s Passion. This is what the Apostle says (Rom 8:3,4): ‘What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.’ And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2Cor. 1:20: ‘Whatever are the promises of God, in Him,’ i.e. in Christ, ‘they are ‘Yea’.’ Again, in this respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written (Col 2:17) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were ‘a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ’; in other words, the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure. Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. […] His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. […] Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. […] Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of perfection […] (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 107, a.1)

  • Opposition to the faith is also unbelief – it arises from the pride of not willing to subject to the sound interpretation of the Fathers

Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Is 53:1 Who hath believed our report?’ It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin. […] Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that ‘presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 10, a. 1)

…judges Francis’ idea on Christ at the Final Judgment

  • All human affairs are included in Christ’s judiciary power

For, to whomsoever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation, to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ’s judgment, as is evident from Mt 25:31, 40. Consequently, it is manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ’s judiciary power. (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 59, a. 4)

…judges Francis’ idea on boasting of our sins

  • Infirmity is the material on which to exercise humility, patience and temperance; and the occasion for fighting unto perfect virtue

Then he gives the reason for the Lord’s response when he says, ‘for my power is made perfect in weakness [infirmity]’. This is a remarkable expression: virtue is made perfect in infirmity… But this can be understood in two ways, namely, materially and by way of occasion. If it is taken materially, the sense is this: infirmity is the material on which to exercise virtue; first, humility, as stated above; secondly, patience: ‘The testing of your faith produces steadfastness’ (Jas 1:3); thirdly, temperance, because hunger is weakened by infirmity and a person is made temperate. But if it is taken as an occasion, infirmity is the occasion for arriving at perfect virtue, because a man who knows that he is weak is more careful when resisting, and as a result of fighting and resisting more he is better exercised and, therefore, stronger. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary of the Second Letter to the Corinthians, lect. 3: 2Cor 12:7-10 (no. 479))

  • Glorying of weaknesses: through them the Christ’s grace dwells and is made perfect in us

Then the Apostle mentions the effect of this answer from the Lord, saying: I will all the more gladly boast of my weaknesses, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. He mentions two effects. One is glorying; hence he says: because my virtue is made perfect in infirmity, I will all the more gladly boast of my weaknesses, i.e., given to me for my profit; and this because it joins me closer to Christ: ‘But far be it from me to glory except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (Gal 6:14); […] The reason I will glory gladly is that the power of Christ may rest upon me [dwell in me], i.e., that through infirmity the grace of Christ may dwell and be made perfect in me: ‘He gives power to the faint, and to him who has no might he increases strength’ (Is 40:29). The other effect is joy. Hence he says: For the sake of Christ, then, I am content with weaknesses. In regard to this he does two things. First, he mentions the effect of joy; secondly, he assigns the reason for it (v. 10b). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary of the Second Letter to the Corinthians, lect. 3: 2 Cor. 12:7-10 (no. 480-481))

  • Joy in weaknesses: they are the occasion to suffer for Christ and to receive God’s help

The other effect is joy. Hence he says: For the sake of Christ, then, I am content with weaknesses. In regard to this he does two things. First, he mentions the effect of joy; secondly, he assigns the reason for it. He mentions the effect of joy and the matter of joy. He says therefore: ‘Because the power of Christ dwells in me in all tribulations, I am content’, i.e., I am greatly pleased and take joy in the infirmities I mentioned: ‘Count it all joy, my brethren, when you meet various trials’ (Jas. 1:2). […] But in all these things the material which makes for joy is that they are for Christ. As if to say: I am pleased because I suffer for Christ: ‘But let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief’ (1 Pet 4:15). […] He assigns the reason for this joy, when he says, ‘for when I am weak, then I am strong,’ i.e., when as a result of what is in me or as a result of persecutions, I fall into any of the aforesaid, God’s help is applied to me to strengthen me. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary of the Second Letter to the Corinthians, lect.3: 2 Cor. 12:7-10 (no. 480-481))

…judges the act of seeking blessings from heretics and schismatics

  • The Church forbids the faithful to communicate with heretics

The Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 10, a. 9)

…judges Francis’ idea on sin and mercy

  • It is also necessary to do penance for the pardon of venial sins

Forgiveness of sin, as stated above (q.86, a.2), is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by venial sin man’s affections are clogged, so that they are slow in tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both of them man’s will is disordered through turning inordinately to a created good. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 87, a. 1)

  • True penance consists in abandoning sin

Mortal sin cannot be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 86, a. 3)

  • Turning away from the infinite good, God, deserves an infinite punishment: the ‘pain of loss’ of God forever

Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the ‘pain of loss,’ which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the ‘pain of sense,’ which is also finite. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 87, a. 4)

  • Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not the act but the stain: an irreparable fault incurs everlasting punishment

Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 87, a. 4)

…judges Francis’ idea on eternal condemnation

  • The condemnation of the reprobates is bitter, just and everlasting

The when saying in flaming fire, deals with both chastising the evil and rewarding the good; but in the chastisement of the evil shows to be bitter, just and everlasting. Then it says, inflicting vengeance, that is, judging the reprobates with flaming fire, reducing to ashes the face of the earth, consuming the damned and casting them down forever. […] This chastisement is everlasting, for they shall suffer the punishment of eternal destruction […] from which it is said that they will be so to say always dying: ‘Death shall be their shepherd’ (Ps 48:15). ‘Their worm shall not die’ (Is 66:24); ‘nor their fire be extinguished.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Second Letter to the Thessalonians, c. 1, lect.2 – 2Thess1: 6-12Spanish)

…judges Francis’ idea on the impossibility of finding God with entire certainty

  • Conformity of life with the divine Law is the source of rectitude

The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 109, a.2, ad 3)

  • The truth of the faith is strong in itself, and is not overcome by any attack

Because truth is strong in itself and is overcome by no attack, it must be our intention to show that the truth of faith cannot he overcome by reason. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Suma contra Gentiles, l. IV, c. 10, n. 15)

…judges Francis’ idea on First Holy Communion

  • The most important of sacrifices

This sacrament was appropriately instituted at the supper, when Christ conversed with His disciples for the last time. First of all, because of what is contained in the sacrament: for Christ is Himself contained in the Eucharist sacramentally. […]  Secondly, because without faith in the Passion there could never be any salvation, according to Romans 3:25: ‘Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood.’ It was necessary accordingly that there should be at all times among men something to show forth our Lord’s Passion; the chief sacrament of which in the old Law was the Paschal Lamb. Hence the Apostle says (1Cor 5:7): ‘Christ our Pasch is sacrificed.’ But its successor under the New Testament is the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is a remembrance of the Passion now past, just as the other was figurative of the Passion to come. […] Consequently, since, as Pope Alexander I says, ‘among sacrifices there can be none greater than the Body and Blood of Christ, nor any more powerful oblation’; our Lord instituted this sacrament at His last parting with His disciples. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, III, q. 73, a.5)

  • A Sacrament confirmed by Christ’s words

Hilary says (De Trin., 8): ‘There is no room for doubt regarding the truth of Christ’s body and blood; for now by our Lord’s own declaring and by our faith His flesh is truly food, and His blood is truly drink.’ And Ambrose says (De Sacram., 6): ‘As the Lord Jesus Christ is God’s true Son so is it Christ’s true flesh which we take, and His true blood which we drink.’
The presence of Christ’s true body and blood in this sacrament cannot be detected by sense, nor understanding, but by faith alone, which rests upon Divine authority. Hence, on Luke 22:19: ‘This is My body which shall be delivered up for you,’ Cyril says: ‘Doubt not whether this be true; but take rather the Saviour’s words with faith; for since He is the Truth, He lieth not.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 75, a.1)

  • Whoever receives this Sacrament is made one with Christ, and incorporated in His members

In this sacrament, as in the others, that which is a sacrament is a sign of the reality of the sacrament. Now there is a twofold reality of this sacrament, as stated above (Question 73, Article 6): one which is signified and contained, namely, Christ Himself; while the other is signified but not contained, namely, Christ’s mystical body, which is the fellowship of the saints. Therefore, whoever receives this sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made one with Christ, and incorporated in His members. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 80, a. 4)

  • Through the Eucharist, the Church’s children are united to one another

This sacrament has a threefold significance. one with regard to the past, inasmuch as it is commemorative of our Lord’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, as stated above (q. 48, a. 3), and in this respect it is called a ‘Sacrifice.’ With regard to the present it has another meaning, namely, that of Ecclesiastical unity, in which men are aggregated through this Sacrament; and in this respect it is called Communio or Synaxis. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth., 4) that ‘it is called Communion because we communicate with Christ through it, both because we partake of His flesh and Godhead, and because we communicate with and are united to one another through it.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 73, a.4)

…judges Francis’ idea on God’s presence in a sinner’s life

  • God is present in all, but not in the same way

God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (q.43 a.3). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. […] Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I, q. 8, a. 3)

…judges Francis’ idea on selling off churches to feed the poor

  • Ecclesiastical goods must not be applied only for the poor

Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII, qu.2, can. de reditibus): ‘Of the Church’s revenues or the offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective merits.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 184. a. 7)

…judges Francis’ idea on the obedience of a Religious

  • Superiors act in virtue of the authority established by God

Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. On natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q. 104, a. 1)

  • The pastor’s task is to instruct on faith and good conduct

The pastor’s specific task in the Church is to instruct the people in what pertains to faith and good conduct. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians, lect. 4, Eph 4:11-13)

  • The order of justice requires our obedience

‘Each person is subject to superior powers’ (v.1): Superior powers mentioned here mean men in authority, to whom we must subject ourselves according to the order of justice. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Super Epistulam ad Romanos, ch.13, lect. 1French)

…judges Francis’ idea on all being saved

  • Those who work evil do not deserve the future life

In this matter we should note that contrary causes beget contrary effects. Thus action that proceeds from malice is contrary to action that proceeds from virtue. Accordingly wretchedness, in which evil action issues, is the opposite of happiness, which virtuous action merits. Furthermore, contraries pertain to the same genus. Therefore, since final happiness, which is reached by virtuous action, is a good that belongs not to this life but to the next life, as is clear from an earlier discussion, final wretchedness, also, to which vice leads, must be an evil belonging to the next world. Besides, all goods and ills of this life are found to serve some purpose. External goods, and also bodily goods, are organically connected with virtue, which is the way leading directly to beatitude, for those who use such goods well. But for those who use these goods ill, they are instruments of vice, which ends up in misery. Similarly the ills opposed to such goods, as sickness, poverty, and the like, are an occasion of progress in virtue for some but aggravate the viciousness of others, according as men react differently to such conditions. But what is ordained to something else cannot be the final end, because it is not the ultimate in reward or punishment. Therefore neither ultimate happiness nor ultimate misery consists in the goods or ills of this life. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium of Theology, ch. 173)

  • It is not unjust for God to inflict eternal punishment to an obstinate sinner

The suffering of eternal punishment is in no way opposed to divine justice. Even in the laws men make, punishment need not correspond to the offense in point of time. For the crime of adultery or murder, either of which may be committed in a brief span of time, human law may prescribe lifelong exile or even death, by both of which the criminal is banned forever from the society of the state. Exile, it is true, does not last forever, but this is purely accidental, owing to the fact that man’s life is not everlasting; but the intention of the judge, we may assume, is to sentence the criminal to perpetual punishment, so far as he can. In the same way it is not unjust for God to inflict eternal punishment for a sin committed in a moment of time. We should also take into consideration the fact that eternal punishment is inflicted on a sinner who does not repent of his sin, and so he continues in his sin up to his death. And since he is in sin for eternity, he is reasonably punished by God for all eternity. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium of Theology, ch. 183)

  • Graver punishment is due for offense to a greater person – God is infinite, offense to Him merits infinite punishment

Furthermore, any sin committed against God has a certain infinity when regarded from the side of God, against whom it is committed. For, clearly, the greater the person who is offended, the more grievous is the offense. He who strikes a soldier is held more gravely accountable than if he struck a peasant; and his offense is much more serious if he strikes a prince or a king. Accordingly, since God is infinitely great, an offense committed against Him is in a certain respect infinite; and so a punishment that is in a certain respect infinite is duly attached to it. Such a punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, for nothing created can be infinite in this way. Consequently a punishment that is infinite in duration is rightly inflicted for mortal sin. Moreover, while a person is still capable of correction, temporal punishment is imposed for his emendation or cleansing. But if a sinner is incorrigible, so that his will is obstinately fixed in sin, as we said above is the case with the damned, his punishment ought never to come to an end. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Compendium of Theology, ch. 183)

…judges Francis’ idea on the teaching of moral issues

  • Confess the faith publically despite the disturbance of unbelievers

Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (Mt 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that ‘the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized,’ He answered: ‘Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3)

…judges Francis’ idea that the Church should not be a Point of Reference

  • Excommunication is fitting for whoever separate from the Church through schism

According to Wisdom 11:11 – ‘By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished.’ Now a schismatic, as shown above (article 1), commits a twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power. (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 39, a.4)

…judges Francis’ idea on happiness

  • Only the universal good can satisfy the human will

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: ‘Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.’ Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, q. 2, a. 8)

…judges Francis’ ideas on fraternal correction and love

  • Fraternal correction is the most important act of charity

Consequently, the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone’s evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person’s good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well. Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because thereby we drive out our brother’s evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice between one man and another. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 33, a.1)

…judges Francis’ ideas on the Roman Curia

  • The diversity of duties in the Church and their purpose

 The difference of states and duties in the Church regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fullness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle’s words (Eph. 4:11-12): ‘He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints.’ Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom 12:4,5), ‘As in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body in Christ.’ Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3Kings 10:4,5) that ‘when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon … and the apartments of his servants, and the order of his ministers … she had no longer any spirit in her.’ Hence the Apostle says (2Tim 2:20) that ‘in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth.’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 183, a. 2)

… judges Francis’ ideas on the Old Covenant still being valid

  • The Old Law contained three kinds of precepts: moral, ceremonial and juridical

 We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. “moral” precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; “ceremonial” precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and “judicial” precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom 7:12) after saying that the “Law is holy,” adds that “the commandment is just, and holy, and good”: “just,” in respect of the judicial precepts; “holy,” with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word “sanctus” – “holy” is applied to that which is consecrated to God); and “good,” i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, q. 99, a.4, co.)

  • The moral precepts are parts of the precepts of the Decalogue

The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 100, a.1, co.)
The precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 100, a. 3)

  • The Ceremonial precepts pertain to divine worship

 The ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q.101, a.1)

  • The ceremonial precepts cannot purify from sin for they do not contain grace within themselves

On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, “Who taketh away the sins [Vulgate: ‘sin’] of the world” (John 1:29). […] Consequently they could not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says (Hebrews 10:4) that “it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away”; and for this reason he calls them (Gal 4:9) “weak and needy element”: weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact that they do not contain grace within themselves. […] It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q.103, a.2)

  • The ceremonial precepts should disappear in order to institute the ceremonies of the New Law

 Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them — in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but “thanksgiving and voice of praise” (Is 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed (Apoc 21:22): “I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb.” Proportionately, therefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present.
The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ’s Passion: hence Our Lord said then: “It is consummated” (Jn 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ “the veil of the temple was rent.” (Mt 27:51)  (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q.103, a. 3, co./ad2)

  •  It is a mortal sin to observe the old rites after the Passion of Christ

The Apostle says (Gal 5:2): “If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s fruit. Therefore since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.
All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well as by words:
and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them was it said: “Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son,” where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she “conceived and bore.” In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. XIX, 16), who says: “It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which Christians share, are the actual representation.”  (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q.103, a.4, s.c. /co)

  • The judicial precepts referring to human relations among the hebrew people ceased with the coming of Christ

 Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 104, a. 1, co)

The judicial precepts did not bind forever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only “dead,” but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q.104, a.3, co.)

  • Christ Fulfilled the Law and Perfected it through Words and Doctrine Granting Grace for its Fulfillment

 Our Lord said (Mt 5:17): “I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill”: and went on to say (Mt 5:18): “One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled.” Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. […] The end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ’s Passion. This is what the Apostle says (Rom 8:3-4): “What the Law could not do …God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh… hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.” And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2 Corinthians 1:20: “Whatever are the promises of God, in Him,” i.e. in Christ, “they are ‘Yea’.” Again, in this respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written (Col 2:17) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were “a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ”; in other words, the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure. Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be circumcised and to fulfill the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being; according to Gal 4:4: “Made under the Law.” In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in Mt 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: “One thing is wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast,” etc. [Saint Thomas combines Mt 19:21 with Mk 10:21.]  (Saint Thomas Aquinas. I-II, q. 107, a. 2, s.c. /co.)

  • The New Law perfects the Old Law

 Every law ordains human conduct to some end. […] Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends. […] We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same end, namely, man’s subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to Rom 3:30: “It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith.” According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col 3:14) that it is “the bond of perfection.” […] All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. […] Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the “law of fear,” inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is called the “Law of love”: and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something foreign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as “restraining the hand, not the will”; since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness: and hence the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I-II, q. 107, a. 1, co./ad 2)

  • By observing their rites, the Jews bear witness to our faith

Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good – that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak.  (Saint Thomas Aquinas, II-II, q. 10 a. 11, co)

  • The blindness of the Jews was permitted for the good of the gentiles

 First, with respect to the fall of particular Jews, when he says: a hardening has come upon Israel, not universally but upon a part: “Blind the heart of this people” (Is 6:10). Secondly, he predicts the end of this blindness, saying: until the full number of the Gentiles come in to the faith, i.e., not only some Gentile nations as were then converted; but either in all or the greater part the Church would be establishes: “The earth is the Lord’s and all its fullness” (Ps 23:1) (…) It should be noted that the word, until, can signify the cause of the blindness of the Jews. For God permitted them to be blinded, in order that the full number of the Gentiles come in. It can also designate the termination, i.e., that the blindness of the Jews will last up to the time when the full number of the Gentiles will come to the faith. With this agrees his next statement, namely, and then, i.e., when the full number of the Gentiles has come in, all Israel will be saved, not some, as now, but universally all: “I will save them by the Lord their God” (Hos 1:7); “He will again have compassion upon us” (Mic 7:19). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Ch. 11, lectio 4)

  • Mercy for the Jews will be in virtue of the New Covenant

 Thirdly, he shows the manner of salvation when he says: And this will be my covenant with them, a new one from me, when I take away their sins. For the old covenant did not remove sins, because “it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins” (Heb 10:4). Therefore, because the Old Testament was imperfect, a new testament is promised to them: “I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah” (Jer 31:31) and it will have the power to remit sin through the blood of Christ: “This is my blood of the new covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins” (Mt 26:28); “He will cast all our sins into the depths of the sea” (Mic 7:19).  (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Ch. 11, lectio 4)

  • The enmity of the Jews toward the Gospel helped in the diffusion of the Gospel itself

 As regards the gospel, which they resist, they are enemies for your sake, i.e., it has turned out to your benefit. Hence, it says in Lk (19:27): “As for those enemies of mind, who did not want me to reign over them, bring them here and slay them before me”; and in Jn (15:24): “But now they have seen and hated both me and my Father.” Or as regards the gospel means their enmity has helped the gospel, which has been spread everywhere by reason of such enmity: “In the word of truth of the gospel, which has come to you, as indeed in the whole world it is bearing fruit and growing” (Col 1:5). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Ch. 11, lectio 4)

  • The Jews will obtain mercy because of the promises made to their forefathers

 But they are beloved by God for the sake of their forefathers as regards election, because He chose their descendants on account of their forefathers’ grace: “The Lord loved your fathers and chose their descendants after them” (Dt 10:15). This does not means that the merits established by the fathers were the cause of the eternal election of the descendants, but that God from all eternity chose the fathers and the sons in such a way that the children would obtain salvation on account of the fathers; not as though the merits of the fathers were sufficient for the salvation of the sons, but through an outpouring of divine grace and mercy, the sons would be saved on account of the promises made to the fathers. […]Then when he says, For the gifts, he excludes an objection. For someone might claim that even though the Jews were formerly beloved on account of their forefathers, nevertheless the hostility they exert against the gospel prevents them from being saved in the future. But the Apostle asserts that this is false, saying: The gifts and call o God are irrevocable, i.e., without repentance. As if to say: That God gives something to certain ones or call certain ones is without repentance, because God does not change His mind: “The Lord has sworn and will not change his mind” (Ps 110:4). However, this seems false, for the Lord says: “It repenteth me that I made man”. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Ch. 11, lectio 4)

  • God wishes that all be saved by his Mercy

 God wishes all men to be saved by His mercy, in order that they be humbled by this fact and ascribe their salvation not to themselves but to God: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: they help is only in me” (Hos 13:9); “In order that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be made subject to God” (Rom 3:19). (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Ch. 11, lectio 4)

…judges Francis’ ideas on peace

  • Since Peace is the Fruit of Charity, Without Grace True Peace Cannot Exist

Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above. The first is the result of one’s own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one’s own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity —the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object— the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor’s will as though it were ours.Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 29, a.3, co. /ad1)

  • The Simple Faithful Should Not Communicate With Unbelievers for Fear of Their Own Perversion

I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered from the Apostle’s words. […] With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica II-II, q.10, a.9)

…judges Francis’ ideas on all being Children of God

  • All are obliged to receive Baptism

 Men are bound to that without which they cannot obtain salvation. Now it is manifest that no one can obtain salvation but through Christ; wherefore the Apostle says (Rm 5, 18): “As by the offense of one unto all men unto condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men unto justification of life.” But for this end is Baptism conferred on a man, that being regenerated there by, he may be incorporated in Christ, by becoming His member: wherefore it is written (Ga 3, 27): “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ.” Consequently it is manifest that all are bound to be baptized: and that without Baptism there is no salvation for men. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q. 68, a. 1)

…judges Francis’ ideas on whether the Lord always pardons

  • Penance requires contrition, confession and satisfaction.

Whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God’s place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he atone according to the decision of God’s minister, and this is done in satisfaction. (Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica III, q.90, a.2, resp.) 

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